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ENERGY EMERGENCIES
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ABSTRACT—Emergency powers are essential to the proper functioning of
the government. Emergencies demand swift and decisive action; yet, our
system of government also values deliberation and procedures. To enable
such agility in a system fraught with bureaucracy, Congress frequently
delegates unilateral statutory emergency powers directly to its most nimble
actor: the President. The powers Congress delegates to the President are vast
and varied, and often sacrifice procedural requirements in favor of
expediency. Most scholars and policymakers have come to terms with this
tradeoff, assuming that the need to respond quickly is outweighed by any
loss of accountability.
This Article challenges this long-standing assumption and is skeptical
of the zero-sum framework that suggests accountability and expediency
cannot coexist in statutory emergency delegations. Specifically, it develops
an Executive Delegations Matrix to better evaluate the different delegation
options, demonstrating that accountability and expediency need not be
mutually exclusive. This Article then uses emergency energy powers to test
the viability of the factors favoring unilateral delegations, ultimately finding
these factors unpersuasive in the energy-emergency context. Instead of the
common knee-jerk reaction to unilateral presidential control over
emergencies, this Article finds that Congress can often cultivate a more
balanced decision-making framework by providing a greater role for expert
agencies. By challenging the assumptions underlying unilateral presidential
delegations for energy emergencies, this Article provides a new framework
for assessing the world of unilateral presidential delegations more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
Nobody likes an emergency. By definition, it suggests that something
unexpected or unforeseen has happened.1 There is little room for hesitation.
The response must be “immediate” and “urgent.”2 To respond effectively to
an urgent need, Congress often defaults to delegating statutory emergency
powers directly to the President.3 This allows the President to use her unique
position in our government to act unshackled by typical procedural
restrictions that constrain agencies and other branches.4 For instance, the
1

Merriam Webster defines an emergency as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the
resulting state that calls for immediate action” or “an urgent need for assistance or relief.”
Emergency,
MERRIAM
WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency
[https://perma.cc/YP9U-LN2E].
2
Id.
3
See Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2018);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263 (1988) (“The vast majority of the foreign affairs powers the
President exercises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather, authorities that Congress has
expressly or impliedly delegated to him by statute.”).
4
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–
10 (1993) (describing the use of executive orders by different presidents throughout history); Erica
Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2030–31 (2015) (discussing executive orders
and their enforceability); Steven Ostrow, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action
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President is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its
attendant rulemaking procedures.5 Thus, the President is not subject to
Chevron deference from reviewing courts,6 nor a multitude of other
procedural rules.7 In delegating statutory emergency powers to the President,
Congress often finds that waiving procedural requirements is a worthwhile
sacrifice for the sake of assumed benefits like expediency, expertise,
accountability, and consistency.
For all its merits, however, this approach is not without consequences.
Emergency powers are also subject to abuse.8 Without meaningful
constraints on a direct presidential delegation, a president is free to declare
questionable emergencies to unlock these statutory powers.9 Even more
controversial is when a president declares questionable emergencies to
unlock these powers in direct contradiction of congressional intent.10
Because emergency powers are so broadly granted and representative
procedure is so easily abandoned, the inevitable result can involve
unaccountability and aggrandizement of the President.11

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 659 (1987) (“[E]xecutive orders
have become an important weapon in the arsenal of presidential policymaking.”).
5
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
6
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“When a court reviews
an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.”
(emphasis added)); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
7
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7 (discussing congressional procedures of the Legislative Branch,
including majorities needed to enact legislation).
8
For example, consider President Trump’s failed attempt to bail out the coal industry using
emergency powers. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Sept. 29, 2017) (to
be codified 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); SHARON JACOBS & ARI PESKOE, ENERGY EMERGENCIES VS.
MANUFACTURED CRISES: THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO DISRUPT POWER MARKETS 11 (2019),
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Emergencies-vs-Manufactured-CrisesFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2SM-DWU7] (exploring the potential for “manufactured crises” with
regard to emergency energy powers). For an example of President Trump’s use of statutory national
security powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny entry to immigrants, see Exec. Order
No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) (titled “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements”), and Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (titled “Protecting the
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”).
9
See Stein, supra note 3, at 1220–44.
10
Charlie Savage, Presidents Have Declared Dozens of Emergencies, but None Like Trump’s, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/trump-presidency-nationalemergency.html [https://perma.cc/Q5CC-HEJC] (describing how President Trump redirected funds to the
border wall in direct contradiction of a congressional denial of such funds).
11
Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency Emergency
Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3348–53 (2013) (providing empirical work on the rise of agencies’
use of the “good cause” exception of the Administrative Procedure Act).
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Given the constitutional and historical deference to presidents on
matters of national security, Congress’s delegation of statutory emergency
powers to the President can be seen as an expected extension of her Article
II powers as Commander in Chief and the nation’s sole protector against
foreign threats. This might suggest that the President only enjoys such
unilateral statutory powers when the nation’s national security is threatened.
After an exhaustive search through the U.S. Code, however, and contrary to
conventional thinking on the scope of a president’s emergency powers, this
Article demonstrates that this is not the case. In addition to providing the
President unilateral powers to act in response to foreign threats, Congress
has provided the President unilateral emergency powers in another
unsuspecting area: energy.12
On one level, this makes sense. Energy emergencies traditionally
involved oil, a commodity with important international and geopolitical
implications on a global scale.13 The United States relies on three fossil fuels
(petroleum, coal, and natural gas) for 80% of its energy needs, much of
which was historically imported from other countries.14 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the first generation of emergency energy powers focused on
allowing swift responses to shortages of these resources.15
But on another level, delegating powers to address energy emergencies
solely to the President stands as an outlier amongst the many military,
foreign-relations, international-trade, and war powers that Congress has
12
See infra Appendix A. The focus on energy emergencies in no way suggests that they are the only
area where Congress has delegated broad emergency powers to the President. See infra Part II and
Appendix B for a complete list.
13
On several occasions, past presidents used the Trade Agreements Expansion Act to regulate oil
prices and imports in the interest of national security. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4341, 40 Fed. Reg.
3965 (Jan. 27, 1975) (“I judge it necessary and consistent with the national security to further discourage
importation into the United States of petroleum, petroleum products, and related products, in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security . . . in order to achieve
the above objectives, I determine that a supplemental fee should be imposed on all imports of petroleum
and petroleum products . . . .”); Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (Mar. 12, 1959) (“I find and
declare that adjustments must be made in the imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished products,
so that such imports will not so threaten to impair the national security . . . .”); see also Anand Toprani,
A Primer on the Geopolitics of Oil, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/a-primer-on-the-geopolitics-of-oil/ [https://perma.cc/4DSA-HPXU]
(discussing the interrelated nature of the oil market and the international impacts of national oil policies).
14
U.S. Energy Facts Explained: Consumption and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 7,
2020)
[hereinafter
Energy
Facts:
Consumption
and
Production],
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://perma.cc/M6M6-SPJ9]; U.S. Energy
Facts Explained: Imports and Exports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/imports-and-exports.php [https://perma.cc/RJB4M86H].
15
See infra Part II.
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provided to the President alone.16 It is particularly jarring when one considers
that the nature of an energy emergency has shifted over time, as the United
States has enhanced its supply of domestic fossil fuel resources17 and
diversified its electricity portfolio to include more renewable resources.18 As
just one recent example of the changing nature of energy emergencies, the
2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic resulted in a surplus
of a fossil fuel resource, with oil prices plunging to negative $37 per barrel—
a 300% drop with global ramifications.19 Notably, as energy surpluses were
not traditionally cause for an emergency, the President has limited statutory
authority to address such a scenario.20 Upon closer reflection, future energy
emergencies are more likely to involve the nation’s electric grid, affected by
16

Infra Appendix B (Strong President/Weak Agency).
In 2016, for the fifth consecutive year, the United States remained the top producer of petroleum
hydrocarbons. Linda Doman, United States Remains the World’s Top Producer of Petroleum and Natural
Gas
Hydrocarbons,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(June
7,
2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31532 [https://perma.cc/M9ZS-HM27]. Largely
attributable to increased drilling activity in both the Permian region and Federal Offshore Gulf of Mexico,
this trend is expected to continue, as forecasts indicate an expected increase in U.S. petroleum production
from 15.6 million barrels/day (b/d) in 2017 to 16.7 million b/d in 2018, compared to a projected
production capacity by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of 39.9 million b/d
in 2018. Id.; Matthew French & Jeff Barron, U.S. Crude Oil Production Increases Following Higher
Drilling
Activity,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Feb.
21,
2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30032 [https://perma.cc/SYR6-8BCY]. An estimated
264 billion barrels of oil reserves in existing fields, new projects, and recently discovered locations remain
untapped, surpassing reserve volumes of both Russia and Saudi Arabia. Matt Egan, U.S. Has More
Untapped Oil than Saudi Arabia or Russia, CNN BUS. (July 5, 2016, 12:04 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/05/investing/us-untapped-oil/index.html?iid=surge-story-summary
[https://perma.cc/S8XA-FN36].
18
Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 20, 2020)
[hereinafter Electricity Explained], https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-theus.php#:~:text=The%20three%20major%20categories%20of,geothermal%2C%20and%20solar%20
thermal%20energy [https://perma.cc/3L2D-7Z27].
19
See Catherine Ngai, Olivia Raimonde & Alex Longley, Oil Plunges Below Zero for First Time in
Unprecedented
Wipeout,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
20,
1:59
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-19/oil-drops-to-18-year-low-on-global-demandcrunch-storage-woes [https://perma.cc/YN3G-PJSC] (stating that oil price per barrel at the close of
business on April 17 was $18.27 and fell to negative $37.63 three days later).
20
See, e.g., Laila Kearney & Timothy Gardner, Exclusive: U.S. Aims to Lease Space in Emergency
Oil Stockpile, After Buying Plan Canceled - Sources, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2020, 6:56 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil-usa-reserve-exclusive/exclusive-us-aims-to-lease-spacein-emergency-oil-stockpile-after-buying-plan-canceled-sources-idUSKBN21I3NG
[https://perma.cc/Y8RH-S92B]. But once that reserve runs out, there is no energy emergency authority
to address such a situation, leaving the Trump Administration with only soft-law strategies such as
encouraging OPEC+ countries to constrain supply and advocating for states to “fill up every cavity that
we have in this country.” Remarks by President Trump in Meeting with Energy Sector CEOs, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Apr. 3, 2020, 3:18 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-meeting-energy-sector-ceos [https://perma.cc/LF8F-JY2B].
17
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natural disasters,21 cybersecurity and physical security weaknesses,22
infrastructure deficiencies, or operator and regulatory misjudgments.23 Such
energy emergencies of the future are much more akin to emergencies that
can occur in other traditionally domestic sectors such as the environmental,
agriculture, employment, and health-care sectors, where Congress has
delegated emergency powers to the respective expert agency.24 And while all
of these sectors, including energy, can have international implications, they
do not necessarily fit easily into a category of national security threats from
foreign powers traditionally viewed as being within a president’s sole
jurisdiction or expertise.

21

See, e.g., OFF. OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
COMPARING THE IMPACTS OF THE 2005 AND 2008 HURRICANES ON U.S. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 510
(2009); James Wagner & Frances Robles, Puerto Rico Is Once Again Hit by an Islandwide Blackout,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/puerto-rico-power-outage.html
[https://perma.cc/WC9D-CHT9]; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., ENHANCING THE RESILIENCE
OF THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 5070 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/24836/chapter/5#61
[https://perma.cc/H9E9-P8VW].
22
See Blake Sobczak, Experts Assess Damage After First Cyberattack on U.S. Grid, E&E NEWS
(May 6, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060281821 [https://perma.cc/6V9H-DY6A];
Christopher Bosch, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and Privacy Through
Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 136568 (2014); Yi
Deng & Sandeep Shukla, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures—A Survey on the Cyber Security Issues
in the Transmission Subsystem of a Smart Grid, 1 J. CYBER SEC. & MOBILITY 251, 25662 (2012);
MISSION SUPPORT CTR., IDAHO NAT’L LAB’Y, CYBER THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE
U.S. ELECTRIC SECTOR 212 (2016); THOMAS F. MCLARTY III & THOMAS J. RIDGE, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY & CONG., SECURING THE U.S. ELECTRICAL GRID 2125 (2014); David Z.
Bodenheimer, Pulling the Plug on the Nation’s Power Grid: Cyberthreats and Homeland Security
Challenges, 2 SCITECH LAW. 4, 47 (2006); Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector:
The First Step to Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
319, 321 (2013). But see Daniel M. Creekman, A Helpless America? An Examination of the Legal Options
Available to the United States in Response to Varying Types of Cyber-Attacks from China, 17 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 641, 654–55 (2002) (discussing cybersecurity threats to the United States but only
mentioning energy in passing).
23
OFF. OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21,
at 110. See generally TRAVIS FISHER, INST. FOR ENERGY RSCH., ASSESSING EMERGING POLICY
THREATS TO THE U.S. POWER GRID (2015), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Threats-to-U.S.-Power-Grid.compressed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JB7-7N79]
(assessing various emerging threats to the U.S. power grid). Compare Proclamation No. 4341, 40 Fed.
Reg. 3965 (Jan. 27, 1975) (focusing on the threat of relying on foreign oil imports), with Exec. Order No.
13,920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,595 (May 1, 2020) (focusing on the threat of cyberattacks on the U.S. grid).
24
See infra Appendix B. Like environmental, agriculture, employment, and health-care emergencies,
energy emergencies of the future likely will require specialized expertise and will often be limited to the
specific areas of the United States. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; see also infra Section
III.A.1 (comparing environmental emergencies and energy emergencies). Generally, agencies can act on
some of these emergency powers independently (Weak President/Strong Agency) and some of them only
after a presidential emergency declaration (Strong President/Strong Agency). See infra Appendix B.
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This Article analyzes these emergency energy powers25 to test the
viability of the factors favoring unilateral presidential delegations—namely,
expertise, accountability, consistency, and expediency. It challenges the
long-standing assumption that accountability must be sacrificed for
expediency in times of emergency. By using emergency energy powers to
test both the assumptions underlying direct unilateral presidential
delegations, as well as the feasibility of constraining a president through
intra-executive checks, this Article challenges the widely held belief that
emergency responses necessitate unilateral presidential delegations. On the
contrary, this Article finds that expertise, accountability, consistency, and
expediency often can be achieved without fostering unilateral presidential
power. As such, it urges Congress to be more hesitant to cast aside
procedural and substantive constraints on the President in addressing
emergencies such as those involving energy.
Instead of providing the President with unilateral authority, this Article
argues that the nation would often be better served by including expert
energy agencies in emergency decisions. Despite popular academic
contentions that delegations to executive agencies are irrelevant to a
president’s exercise of power under a unitary executive theory,26 this Article
demonstrates how a shared delegation to the President and an expert agency
can result in better decision-making. This Article will further argue that this
is particularly true in an area such as energy, with both executive (the
Department of Energy) and independent (the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission) agencies at the President’s disposal. A technical and
complicated sector such as energy deserves to have expert agencies involved
in critical emergency decisions, especially when Congress can delegate such
shared authority in a way that does not unduly hinder a president’s ability to
act swiftly in times of emergency.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I focuses on Congress’s
decision to delegate emergency powers directly to the President. It evaluates
competing risks and rewards of such unilateral delegations to underscore the
stakes accompanying the choice of delegation. It then develops an Executive
Delegations Matrix to better evaluate the different Executive Branch
delegation options, demonstrating that accountability and expediency need
not be mutually exclusive. Part II then analyzes statutory grants of powers
that allow energy-emergency determinations to be made, confirming
Congress’s tendency to delegate directly to the President. It demonstrates the
25

This research took an inclusive approach to identifying emergency energy powers as described
infra notes 106109. See infra Appendix A for the energy emergency powers and infra Appendix B for
a full list of emergency powers.
26
See infra notes 31 and accompanying text.
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broad extent of these powers, as well as assesses the conditions that must be
met for the delegate to unlock them. The broad discretion Congress provides
to the President is not a problem in and of itself. But when it is combined
with a president who is not responsive to the historical context for such
powers nor to rebukes by the legislature or the Judicial Branch, that broad
discretion becomes a problem. Our system of government cannot function
solely on trust. Part III then urges a shift from unilateral presidential powers
to a more evenhanded sharing of powers within the Executive Branch
between both the President and an agency. Specifically, it exposes the
vulnerabilities in the assumptions that support unilateral presidential control
of energy emergencies, as well as demonstrates how incorporating expert
agencies into emergency delegations can reestablish some of the checks and
balances so essential to our democracy.
I.

STATUTORY EMERGENCY POWERS

Unlike ice cream, emergency powers only come in two flavors: (1)
constitutional and (2) statutory. And, as with ice cream, these powers can
function individually or together as a “swirl.” Presidents have frequently
invoked their constitutional authority under Article II of the Constitution to
address emergencies, which is a topic of frequent scholarly discussion.27 But
these constitutional powers are augmented where they are accompanied by a
more specific grant of statutory authority. Together, this “swirl” has
frequently been used to support presidential emergency action.28
This Article concerns these statutory grants of emergency authority.
More specifically, it focuses on Congress’s all too frequent choice to
delegate such emergency authority wholly and completely to the President
alone.29 While such unilateral delegations make sense in a number of
contexts, particularly those related to national security matters, there are
many situations where the presidency is not the best place to house this
power. Although Congress also delegates emergency powers to agencies,
27

See infra notes 51–54.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) (“[B]y virtue of the authority
vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States . . . and as President of the United States,
and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as
follows . . . .”); Exec. Order No. 11,157, 29 Fed. Reg. 7973 (Apr. 23, 1971) (“By virtue of the authority
vested in me by . . . title 37 [of the] United States Code[] and as President of the United States and
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States . . . .”).
29
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS AND THEIR USE (2019) [hereinafter
BRENNAN REPORT], https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legislation/Emergency%20Power
s_Printv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF2S-FEVA] (identifying 95 of 136 statutory emergency powers that can
be used by the President without any restrictions or constraints).
28
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states, and sometimes courts,30 this Article focuses on the federal Executive
Branch, particularly the choice between the President and an agency as the
delegate of such power to act in times of emergency.
Administrative law scholars have long debated the question of whether
it makes a difference if Congress delegates statutory authority to the
“President” or to an “Administrator.”31 These debates often focus on
situations where Congress has delegated authority to an executive agency. In
such situations, much of the scholarly attention has focused on the extent, if
any, to which an agency can truly exercise this authority independent of the
President’s will.32 Many scholars argue the irrelevance of this choice,
positing that presidents are running the show, regardless of whether the
statutory language actually delegates to the “President” or to an
“Administrator.”33 Consequently, this line of scholarship focuses on how the

30
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 366, 372–80 (2010) (comparing delegations
to agencies and courts under Title VII, arguing for “the significance of the choice of delegate,” and
analyzing four factors that scholars have theorized inform Congress’s choice: “(1) [political alignment
between the recipient of the authority and the Congress], (2) a desire to avoid blame for unpopular
decisions, (3) the relative expertise of possible delegates, and (4) the relative flexibility of delegated
decisionmaking”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (stating that “[i]f the Secretary determines, after
consultation with such public health officials as may be necessary, that . . . disease or disorder presents a
public health emergency” or “a public health emergency . . . otherwise exists,” then the Secretary may
take action (emphasis added)); 7 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (noting that if a governor of a state or a county
committee determines a livestock emergency exists, they may petition the Secretary for assistance);
42 U.S.C. § 11001 (noting that the governor of each state shall appoint a state emergency response
commission).
31
See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence in the
Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 695 (2014) (arguing “that Chevron deference might
sometimes be deployed with a welcoming eye to presidential involvement, but only when problems of
coordination arise”; otherwise, presidential involvement in an interpretation should be given little weight
if unsupported by legal reasoning); Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1961, 2059 (2019) (arguing coordination statutes between agencies passed by Congress should include
delineation to the President to both protect his role as administrator and ensure better review of his
actions).
32
See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2458–61 (2011) (arguing that the choice of delegate may not make much
difference to agency resistance to presidential supervision and that a statutory delegation to the President,
rather than to a “Secretary” or “Administrator,” seems best understood as Congress conveying the power
to the President to choose which Executive Branch official will be primarily responsible for implementing
that delegation, and delegations to the “Secretary” or “Administrator” as restricting that choice).
33
See, e.g., id.; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570–99 (1994); Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration and
Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 300 (1950); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319–20 (2001). See generally Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 118 (1994) (discussing both sides of the unitary
executive argument, but ultimately concluding that “[t]he framers did not constitutionalize presidential
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courts should interpret statutory grants of power that flow directly to
agencies as opposed to the President. Then-Professor, now-Justice Elena
Kagan provoked much of this scholarly debate by suggesting that the words
of the delegation should not matter.34 She persuasively espoused a unitary
executive theory, arguing that any statute that grants power to an executive
agency implicitly grants power to the President, as the head of the Executive
Branch, to direct that agency.35 This approach triggered strong responses
from administrative law scholars, who have argued that Congress’s choice
of delegation language should make a difference.36 Professors Peter Strauss,37
Kevin Stack,38 Robert Percival,39 and Thomas Sargentich40 have countered
Justice Kagan’s approach with arguments that we should construe statutory
delegations, where possible, to increase Executive Branch agency officials’
ability to resist presidential control. Although this debate between Justice
Kagan and Professor Stack continues to periodically rear its head,41 this
Article instead flips the analysis. Instead of focusing on situations where
Congress delegated to an agency, it explores situations where Congress
delegated to the President. And instead of focusing on the difficulties that
agencies face in resisting presidential influence, it asks whether agencies can
be empowered to influence presidential decision-making by expressly
including them in a shared delegation of statutory power.
To answer this question, this Part first explores the justifications for
unilateral presidential emergency authority, balancing them against the
control over all that is now considered ‘executive’; they did not believe that the President must have
plenary power over all we now think of as administration”).
34
Kagan, supra note 33, at 2251.
35
Id. (“[S]tatutory delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing
the President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated discretion.”); see also
Mendelson, supra note 32, at 2458–59.
36
See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 263, 304–10 (2006) [hereinafter Stack, Statutory Powers].
37
See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (“[W]here Congress has delegated
responsibilities to a particular governmental actor it has created, that delegation is a part of the law whose
faithful execution the President is to assure. Oversight, and not decision, is his responsibility.”); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 573, 667–68 (1984) (arguing that the tensions that exist between the three branches of government
should also exist between Congress’s and the President’s role in agency administration, thereby ensuring
one branch does not have total control).
38
See Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 316–23.
39
Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency
Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2533 (2011).
40
Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing
Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
41
See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 730 (2016).
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drawbacks to such choice of delegate. Justifications for unilateral authority
include presidential expertise in emergencies, political accountability as an
elected government actor, consistency across the Executive Branch as the
Commander in Chief, and the ability to act swiftly through executive
orders.42 But, as I have argued elsewhere, Congress has created serious
problems for reviewing courts and those seeking to challenge presidential
emergency determinations through their combination of vague terms,
undifferentiated deference, and lack of procedural requirements prior to
unlocking such broad statutory powers.43 As such, this Part then tests these
competing values against existing delegations of emergency powers.
Evaluating statutory emergency powers across the entire U.S. Code reveals
four categories of executive delegations, each with a different mixture of
presidential and agency authorities. This Article then develops an Executive
Delegation Matrix to both reflect this taxonomy, as well as the tradeoffs
associated with each of these formulations.
A. Advantages of Unilateral Presidential Delegations
Although Congress is rarely explicit in its reasoning behind its choice
of delegate, scholars have extensively theorized about the justifications for
unilateral presidential control.44 Unilateral delegations are those that provide
the President with sole and absolute authority to make an emergency
declaration and subsequently use the attendant emergency powers. The
myriad of justifications can be simplified into four categories, each of which
is discussed below: (1) expertise; (2) accountability; (3) consistency; and (4)
expediency.
1. Expertise
A first factor driving Congress to provide the President with unilateral
emergency authority may be expertise.45 When it comes to emergencies, a
term often synonymous with national security, Congress overwhelmingly
delegates unilaterally to the President as Commander in Chief.46 This choice
of delegate often stems from Article II of the Constitution, which establishes
42

See infra Section I.A.1.
Stein, supra note 3, at 1197–1220; see also infra Section I.A.2.
44
See supra note 39; infra notes 45–47, 49–53, 57–60 and accompanying text.
45
William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative
Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (2018) (citing Strauss, Overseer, supra note 37, at 750–53, for his
discussion of the expertise-based underpinning of such delegations); Aziz Huq, Structural
Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 91116 (2012) (exploring the nuances
of presidential reliance on expertise).
46
See Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–20.
43
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the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces and empowers and
restrains the President with the Take Care Clause.47 Although there is no
guarantee that any one elected president is actually an expert in addressing
national security emergencies, such expertise is implied by her having this
position.48 Some presidents may have had some previous national security or
foreign-affairs experience to draw upon,49 but other presidents may be
encountering these challenges for the first time in their presidential role.50
Regardless, the Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed this formulation of
national security exceptionalism in decisions such as Curtiss-Wright,
providing near absolute deference to the President over foreign affairs and
national security.51 The Supreme Court referenced the inherent power of the
President to represent the nation in foreign affairs and to protect security
interests as legal reason to defer to the judgment of the President.52 Some
scholars similarly refer to the presidency as the best place in our system of
government to house powers related to national security and foreign affairs.53
47

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3.
Ameziane v. Obama, 699 F.3d 488, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is within the role of the executive
to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); Gregory S. McNeal, The Pre-NSC
Origins of National Security Expertise, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2012) (“[O]ne can accept either
that Congress (rightly or wrongly) will oftentimes defer to the President’s functional expertise, or one can
adopt the view that because of his greater functional expertise the President possesses inherent authority
to act in matters of national security.”).
49
See, e.g., Secretaries of State Who Became President, CNN (Aug. 11, 2016, 11:00 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/11/politics/gallery/secretaries-of-state-who-became-president/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Y32D-EV26] (listing nine presidents that previously served as Secretary of State);
Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/
[https://perma.cc/Y859-WY5P] (elaborating on past U.S. presidents’ backgrounds).
50
See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Donald Trump: Life Before the Presidency, UVA MILLER CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/president/trump/life-presidency [https://perma.cc/4XAE-M6XF] (detailing
President Trump’s career as a business person before becoming president); Lou Cannon, Ronald Reagan:
Life Before the Presidency, UVA MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/life-before-thepresidency [https://perma.cc/5KXT-CAFM] (detailing President Reagan’s early career as an actor);
Russell
L.
Riley,
Bill
Clinton:
Foreign
Affairs,
UVA
MILLER
CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs [https://perma.cc/8BAB-EUTL] (“Bill Clinton
came into office with relatively little experience in foreign affairs.”).
51
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–29 (1936).
52
See U.S. CONST. art. II; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
53
See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529 (1999) (“I believe that the Constitution is best read
to vest the President with primary constitutional authority over the conduct of foreign affairs and the
protection of national security . . . .”); Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone:
Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1410 (2010) (discussing the argument that
throughout most of American history, Congress respected presidential exclusivity in foreign affairs or
national security); Koh, supra note 3, at 1263–64. But see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security
Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 267–73 (arguing that judicial responses to exigent national
48
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To the extent that many of the historical emergencies involved war, it may
not be surprising that Congress would delegate emergency powers to the
President as the wartime expert.
2. Accountability
Second, many, including Justice Kagan, argue that presidents are the
best recipient of authority because they are politically accountable.54 As
Professor Kathryn Kovacs has noted, “[Justice] Kagan defended presidential
administration on the grounds that the President is more democratically
accountable than agencies both because he provides an ‘electoral link
between the public and the bureaucracy’ and because he ‘enhances
transparency.’”55 “[Justice] Kagan argued that the President’s national
constituency makes him more responsive to ‘the preferences of the general
public, rather than merely parochial interests.’”56 Many scholars agree with
Justice Kagan that the President is in the best position to design policy
reflective of the public’s interests as a whole because her elected status
reflects the majoritarian position of the nation.57 There is also some

security policies are not exceptional but are “thoroughly imbricated in the larger texture of American
public law”).
54
Kagan, supra note 33, at 233132; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of
the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 60 (2008) (noting that numerous experts “agree that the political
responsiveness of bureaucratic policy to the preferences of the national electorate correlates strongly with
presidential control of the administration”).
55
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L.
REV. 515, 562 (2018) (quoting Kagan, supra note 33, at 2331–32).
56
Id. at 564 (citing Kagan, supra note 33, at 2335).
57
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal
Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 190 (1986) (“Agency officials, by contrast, are only indirectly
accountable . . . . For these reasons, a supervisory role by the President should help ensure that
discretionary decisions by regulatory agencies are responsive to the public generally.”); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 508
(1985) (“Presidents are elected presumably because they share the policy preferences of a majority of
citizens. It follows that they should be permitted to determine social policy within whatever boundaries
Congress has established.”); Watts, supra note 41, at 725 (“[P]residential control can help to further
positive values—namely, political accountability and regulatory coherence in agency decisionmaking.”);
Stephenson, supra note 54, at 59 (“Scholars with diverse ideological and methodological commitments
have asserted . . . that bureaucratic policy should track majoritarian values . . . imply[ing] the need for
presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking, because the president is the institutional actor most
responsive to the preferences of a national majority.”). But see Sidney A. Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction
and the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1805, 1832–33 (2019) (“Because of the electoral
college, a nominee can win the presidency and still lose the popular vote, an anomaly that can prevent the
majority of Americans from holding a president accountable for the president’s deregulatory policies.”);
Tara Law, These Presidents Won the Electoral College — But Not the Popular Vote, TIME (May 15, 2019,
4:58 PM), https://time.com/5579161/presidents-elected-electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/VQA8MJKY] (identifying the four presidents in American history—the most recent two being President Donald
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agreement with Justice Kagan that presidential control enhances
transparency in policymaking, making it more democratically accountable.58
As such, unilateral presidential delegations may be explained by the
President’s political accountability.
3. Consistency
Third, others argue that allowing the President sole decision-making
authority is the best approach for ensuring policy consistency.59 Justice
Kagan has argued that “[c]entral presidential oversight could identify and
then eliminate the inconsistencies and redundancies that these intersecting
delegations introduced into the regulatory process.”60 She further argued that
the President provides more coherent and less factional leadership than
Congress, as her broad jurisdiction over the administrative state allows her
to “synchronize and apply general principles to agency action in a way that
congressional committees, special interest groups, and bureaucratic experts
cannot.”61 Other scholars agree that the President is in a unique position to
coordinate “the sprawling federal bureaucracy,” ensuring both efficiency and
efficacy, “since [she] is responsible for executing many statutes at once.”62
Justice Kagan further argued that “presidential administration is effective
because it lends consistency and dynamism to the process.”63
Coordination benefits from a centralized decision-maker also can be
valuable in the case of emergencies, as was seen to be lacking in both the
uncoordinated response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill emergency that
leaked 168 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico,64 and the
Trump in 2016 and President George W. Bush in 2000—that won the presidential election but lost the
popular vote).
58
See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2332 (“The Presidency’s unitary power structure, its visibility, and
its ‘personality’ all render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that the public can identify
and evaluate.”); Watts, supra note 41, at 734 (arguing that “when exerted through overt mechanisms like
published presidential directives and public speeches, presidential control can help to promote political
accountability and bolster the perceived legitimacy of policy decisions made by unelected agency
officials”).
59
Kagan, supra note 33, at 2340.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 2339, 2349.
62
Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1084 (2013); see also
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131,
1173–81 (2012) (describing “some of the well-established coordination instruments that are uniquely
available to the President, including centralized White House review”).
63
Kovacs, supra note 55, at 562 (citing to Kagan, supra note 33, at 2339).
64
Despite having substantial unilateral emergency powers that could have provided a more
coordinated response, the Obama Administration deferred to the state and Coast Guard responses, leading
to a reliance on outdated emergency management plans, unnecessary delays in responding, a lack of
resources to address the spill, and a lack of accountability. See generally Memorandum from R.J. Papp,
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scattershot response to the COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2019.65
Despite these past failures, some scholars have argued that “[t]he President,
as commander-in-chief and centralized decision-maker, is best suited to
direct coordinated action in times of extreme emergency within the domestic
arena, in exactly the same role that the President assumes in foreign crises.”66
Ultimately, delegating emergency powers to the President may be justified
in hopes of a more unified, coordinated, and consistent response to such
emergencies.
4. Expediency
Lastly, arguments supporting unilateral presidential powers often focus
on the need for expediency, particularly with respect to national security
matters.67 The prevailing wisdom on emergencies is that the government
Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Final Action Memorandum – Incident Specific Preparedness Review
(ISPR) Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=7347
[https://perma.cc/3979-C3B5] (expounding on the issues that hindered the federal government’s effective
response to the BP oil spill); Oil Spills Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 26, 2020, 2:09 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/world/oil-spills-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/X5Q4TAWC].
65
Despite having substantial unilateral emergency powers that could have provided uniformity, the
Trump Administration preferred to let the states address the COVID-19 pandemic on an ad hoc basis,
stating that the federal government was merely “a backup” to the states and even going as far as to say
that the strategic national stockpile of medical equipment was “not supposed to be state stockpiles that
they then use.” Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus
Task Force in Press Briefing, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:48 PM) [hereinafter Remarks by
President Trump], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vicepresident-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-17/
[https://perma.cc/5EFP-YP82].
This lack of uniformity contributed to a counterproductive dynamic where the federal government
preempted the states for protective gear and medical equipment to address the increasing death toll.
Christina Jewett & Lauren Weber, Trump Administration Uses Wartime Powers to Be First in Line on
Medical Supplies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://khn.org/news/trump-administrationuses-wartime-powers-to-be-first-in-line-on-medical-supplies-ppe/ [https://perma.cc/U27S-C33H]. As of
November 12, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had resulted in over 242,787 deaths in the United States.
Coronavirus Resource Center: U.S. Map, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED. (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map [https://perma.cc/4PX8-LTUX].
66
Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in Domestic Emergencies,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301, 318 (2006) (arguing the delay in response to Hurricane Katrina could
have been prevented if the President had unilateral emergency powers to deploy federal military
assistance); see also Megan E. Ball, Note, Blank Checks: An Analysis of Emergency Actions Warranting
Unilateral Executive Action, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 928 (2018) (arguing agencies should not be
allowed to act unilaterally in times of emergency and that emergency situations should be addressed by
the President and Congress as has historically been done to ensure consistency and stability).
67
See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676 (2002)
(“The centralization of authority in the President is particularly crucial in matters of national defense,
war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and
mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch.”); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The nature of transactions with foreign

813

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

response cannot be hamstrung by bothersome procedural or substantive
requirements68 and that the federal executive is in the best position to quickly
address national emergencies.69 As discussed above, conventional thinking
supports the view that the executive is the best branch to handle things
quickly.70 Scholars focus on expediency as an important justification to
delegate solely to the President, arguing that the presidency is the institution
most capable of responding with the speed required to be effective.71 This
rationale applies with significant force to emergency delegations.
nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy
and dispatch.” (emphasis added)); James E. Baker, Speech, What Process Is Due? The Role of Judging
in National Security, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2015) (noting that the pathologies of national
security decision-making include secrecy and speed). Contra Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution:
Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673, 684 (1998) (arguing
expediency is detrimental to foreign policy and that courts should stop being “lulled . . . [by the executive]
into a collective fantasy about the nature of the foreign threat” in “the name of expediency”).
68
Notably, in a few instances, Congress has even waived procedural requirements for agencies acting
during emergencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(f)(3)(J)(i) (“The Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency may waive notice and comment rulemaking with respect to rules to carry out this
section, if the Administrator determines doing so is necessary to expeditiously implement this section,
and may carry out this section as a pilot program until such regulations are promulgated.”(emphasis
added)); 41 U.S.C. § 1707(d) (“The [notice-and-comment] requirements of subsections (a) and (b) may
be waived by the officer authorized to issue a procurement policy, regulation, procedure, or form if urgent
and compelling circumstances make compliance with the requirements impracticable.” (emphasis
added)); see also, e.g., Memorandum from Rosemarie Kelley, Dir., & Karin Leff, Acting Dir., Off. of
Enf’t & Compliance Assurance, Env’t Prot. Agency, to Enf’t Dirs. 4 n.3 (May 3, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-09/documents/updatedguidanceonemergencyauthority
undersection1431sdwa.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV3B-A73A] (“Administrative and judicial implementation
of this authority must occur early enough to prevent the potential hazard from materializing.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 3536 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6488)).
69
The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has demonstrated that state executive branches can
sometimes be even more nimble than the federal Executive Branch. Over a month after the first death
from COVID-19, Washington was the first state to declare a state of emergency on February 29, 2020.
Proclamation by the Governor No. 20-05, State of Wash., Off. of the Governor (Feb. 29, 2020),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/20-05%20Coronavirus%20%28final%29.pdf?utm_med
ium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/8HML-MQZQ]. Thirteen days later, President
Trump issued a national emergency after there were over 1,645 people from forty-seven states infected.
Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID19) Outbreak, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020) [hereinafter Proclamation Concerning the Novel
Coronavirus],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-nationalemergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/7H5J-3Z2S].
70
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1424 n. 213 (2009)
(“[B]oth Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive during emergencies because of the executive’s
institutional advantages in speed, secrecy, and decisiveness.” (quoting ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 16 (2007))).
71
See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 362
(2010) (noting the relative ease of a president to issue executive orders compared to the legislative process
incumbent on Congress); Tkacz, supra note 66, at 302 (arguing that, in the wake of Katrina, Congress
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Most scholars compare speed of the Executive Branch to the Judicial
and Legislative Branches, often observing that the structural features of the
presidency renders that office “institutionally best suited to initiate
government action,” and that the President’s “decision-making processes can
take on degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other
governmental institution can match.”72 Unilateral presidential powers are
also favored over Congress’s powers when comparing their relative speed of
decision-making.73 Congress is often plagued with regulatory gridlock, while
the President is able to use executive orders to more swiftly implement her
will.74 Scholars have repeatedly noted that “the executive branch can move
far more quickly than can Congress or the courts.”75
Comparing the relative expediency of the President versus agencies
within the Executive Branch yields the same critiques. Agencies are
traditionally criticized for their bureaucratic burdens and accompanying
delays.76 As will be discussed in Section III.B.1, agencies are bound by the
rulemaking and process requirements of the APA,77 in stark contrast to the
President’s freedom to implement actions quickly through executive
orders.78 Accordingly, where urgency is the driving force, congressional
delegation of emergency powers to the President is the rational choice. There

should give the President more flexibility in ordering federal troops because the delays were devasting);
see also Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1897, 1939 (2015) (“[S]peed is necessary in emergencies, foreign or domestic . . . .”).
72
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 11819 (1990).
73
Gilman, supra note 71, at 365.
74
See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1993) (describing the use of executive orders by different presidents throughout history); Erica Newland,
Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2030–32 (2015) (discussing executive orders and
their enforceability); Steven Ostrow, Note, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency
Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 659 (1987) (“[E]xecutive
orders have become an important weapon in the arsenal of presidential policymaking.”).
75
Chesney, supra note 70, at 1424 & n.214 (citing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 70, at 5, 18
(2007)); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and
Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959, 968 (2004) (contrasting executive efficiency with a judiciary that “by design
acts far more slowly than either political branch”).
76
Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority Under the SDWA
and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,786, 10,786 (2017)
(criticizing the EPA’s slow response to the Flint water crisis and urging EPA to “invoke its emergency
powers earlier and more frequently to effectuate the SDWA’s preventative purpose and protect public
health”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1386–87 (1992).
77
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
sections of 5 U.S.C.); see also infra Section III.B. But see sources cited supra note 68.
78
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

815

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

are few other categories more deserving of an expedited response than
emergencies. Therefore, relying upon some combination of expertise,
accountability, consistency, and expediency rationales, Congress can
support its delegations of broad and unilateral powers to the President.79
B. Perils of Unilateral Presidential Delegations
Congress’s choice to delegate unilateral authority to the President may
satisfy the values delineated above, but such delegations also have potential
negative consequences due to the lack of internal executive agency checks
and external checks from the judiciary.80 And as pressing as emergencies are,
there are certain values that should not be sacrificed, even in times of a
national emergency.81 This Section explores the resulting dilution of checks
and balances that compromises the transparency and reviewability of these
presidential decisions.
1. Uninformed Decision-Making
A first disadvantage of unilateral presidential delegation is that it allows
the President to sidestep any input from expert agencies. In most situations,
it is unlikely that a president would ever act on her emergency powers
without conferring with her relevant advisors.82 Yet, merely trusting that a
79

See infra Part II.
Kovacs, supra note 55, at 566; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto & Natalia Volosin,
Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers Without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the
Philippines, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 246, 331 (2011) (“As long as US Presidents find ways to act
unilaterally under the national security umbrella, the US risks taking on some aspect of hyperpresidentialism.”).
81
See
CONG.
RSCH.
SERV.,
NATIONAL
EMERGENCY
POWERS
(2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8HM-LQQR] (noting that “the Constitution
makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency”). But see
Order on Plaintiff’s Petition for Preliminary Injunction & Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Binford v.
Sununu, No. 217-2020-CV-00152 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020), rejecting plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunction to overturn the Governor’s ban on social gatherings under the First Amendment’s
Freedom of Assembly and Free Exercise Clauses, and Memorandum Order & Opinion at 1, Legacy
Church v. Kunkel, No. CIV 20-0327-JB-SCY (D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020), rejecting TRO to overturn the
Governor’s ban on social gathering to attend Easter mass at church, as two examples of failed challenges
on religious liberties and First Amendment grounds during the latest COVID-19 pandemic.
82
But see, for example, President Trump contradicting his advisors during a COVID-19 press briefing
by suggesting that ingestion of household disinfectants like Lysol could be a treatment for the
coronavirus, in direct contravention of his scientific experts, the FDA, the CDC, and the makers of Lysol.
Remarks by President Trump, supra note 65 (“Right. And then I see the disinfectant, where it knocks it
out in a minute. One minute. And is there a way we can do something like that, by injection inside or
almost a cleaning . . . . So it would be interesting to check that.” (emphasis added)); see also Katie Rogers,
Christine Hauser, Alan Yuhas & Maggie Haberman, Trump’s Suggestion that Disinfectants Could Be
Used to Treat Coronavirus Prompts Aggressive Pushback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/trump-inject-disinfectant-bleach-coronavirus.html
80
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president will only invoke such powers in true emergencies and confer with
advisors beforehand is an ineffectual constraint on a president.83 For too long,
the American public has proceeded under the assumption that presidents
would only use these emergency powers in the rarest of instances. But
previous attempts to stretch the meaning of “emergency” caution against
relying on trust and presidential self-restraint.84 In reality, a president with a
statutory grant of unilateral authority can invoke these powers without
conferring with any expert agency. This is particularly odd given that a
number of emergencies, such as energy emergencies, are highly technical
and arguably warrant feedback and opinions from agencies with particular
expertise in the field of the emergency at hand. Agencies are often involved
in declaring and responding to emergencies, although sometimes their
response is hamstrung by and dependent on an initial presidential declaration
of an emergency.85 At the very least, Presidents have often recognized the
value of soliciting agencies to assist in responding to emergencies.86 Without
[https://perma.cc/4P42-4UTV] (“[T]he Food and Drug Administration warned that hydroxychloroquine
and chloroquine, two drugs that the president has repeatedly recommended in treating the coronavirus,
can cause dangerous abnormalities in heart rhythm in coronavirus patients and has resulted in some
deaths.”); Improper Use of Disinfectants, LYSOL, https://www.lysol.com [https://perma.cc/DW5QBFHM] (“[W]e must be clear that under no circumstance should our disinfectant products be administered
into the human body (through injection, ingestion or any other route).”).
83
See, e.g., Evan Kraft, Opinion, Trump Knows More than the Fed—According to Him, HILL (Oct.
12, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/411110-trump-knows-more-than-the-fedaccording-to-him [https://perma.cc/JDU7-HNVR]; Daniel W. Drezner, Opinion, Trump Says He Knows
Everything. So Why Do His Decisions Look So Dumb?, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019, 9:15 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/15/trump-says-he-knows-everything-hes-obviouslywrong/?utm_term=.5456a9bbacbe [https://perma.cc/E95X-CLEF].
84
Exec. Order No. 13,928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139, 36,139 (June 11, 2020) (claiming the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction over war crimes committed in Afghanistan and the prospect of being
held accountable for such crimes is an “emergency” under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) that justifies freezing U.S.-based assets of any foreign ICC personnel who try to exercise
jurisdiction over U.S. war crimes and anyone who assists them); Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg.
4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019) (national emergency diverting funds to build a border wall between the United
States and Mexico); Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,843 (Sept. 12, 2018) (national emergency
regarding interference in U.S. election); Exec. Order No. 13,194, 66 Fed. Reg. 7389 (Jan. 18, 2001)
(national emergency prohibiting the importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone).
85
See infra Appendix B; Memorandum on Combatting the National Drug Demand and Opioid Crisis,
82 Fed. Reg. 50,305 (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/31/201723787/combatting-the-national-drug-demand-and-opioid-crisis
[https://perma.cc/A7CF-LYYF]
(encouraging the Secretary of Health and Human Services to declare a public health emergency regarding
the opioid crisis); Proclamation No. 4807, 45 Fed. Reg. 80,809 (Dec. 8, 1980) (“The Secretary of
Agriculture has . . . determined and reported to [President Carter] that a condition exists with respect to
peanuts which requires emergency treatment . . . .”).
86
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Major National Emergency Grant Will Aid
Commercial Fisherman (Jan. 10, 2002) (describing that Secretary of Labor granted $5.9 million out of
her discretionary fund to assist in relocating and retraining fisherman and related industry workers as a
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explicitly requiring consultation with expert agencies, however, Congress is
essentially using unilateral presidential delegations to empower presidents
with the ability to make uninformed decisions.
2. Unbridled Discretion
Second, the resulting corollary to sidestepping an agency is the
inapplicability of the APA, meaning no rulemaking requirements or arbitrary
and capricious review. Although all agencies are subject to the APA, the
Supreme Court in Franklin v. Massachusetts87 held that the President is not
considered an agency governed by the APA and accordingly that the APA
does not apply to presidential action.88 As Professor Evan Criddle has noted,
the Court recognized that although
“[t]he President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview,” it stressed
that “he is not explicitly included, either,” and expressed concern that extending
administrative procedure to presidential action could implicate “separation of
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President.” In the absence
of a particularly clear statement from Congress, the Court reasoned that it
should not construe the APA to limit presidential lawmaking. The Court thus
construed the APA to categorically exempt presidential lawmaking from the
ordinary requirements of administrative procedure.89

major part of President Bush’s “Back-To-Work” package); Presidential Exec. Order Amending Exec.
Order 13,223, 2017 WL 4707724, at *1 (amending a previous executive order to “provide the Secretary
of Defense additional authority to manage personnel requirements”).
87
505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
88
Id. at 801. Accord Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 200 v. Trump, 419 F. Supp. 3d 612, 619
(W.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that, “despite clearly knowing that both the President and OPM may issue ‘civil
service rules and regulations’ in drafting § 1103(b)(1), Congress chose only to require that rules and
regulations ‘proposed by the Office’ be subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements[,]” and finding regulations issued by the President through executive order to not be subject
to the APA). In the rare occasions where Congress imposes a notice-and-comment requirement on the
President, they involve long-term plans or policies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5165c(a), (c) (“The President
shall provide for public notice and opportunity for comment before adopting any new or modified
policy . . . of the public assistance program . . . .”); id. § 8451(b) (“[T]he President shall publish in the
Federal Register a notice and summary of the proposed report, make copies of such report available, and
accord interested persons an opportunity (of not less than 90 days’ duration) to present written comments;
and shall make such modifications of such report as he may consider appropriate on the basis of such
comments.”).
89
Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking,
46 GA. L. REV. 117, 198–99 (2011) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Franklin,
505 U.S. at 800–01).
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In the aftermath of Franklin, courts also have determined that the
President’s actions “are not reviewable for abuse of discretion under the
APA.”90
Similarly, scholars have consistently noted the deficits in transparency
and deliberation when comparing the President and agencies.91 Professor
Kovacs notes that “the President often makes his decisions in a black box
with little to no transparency, much less public participation or deliberation”
and that the “President has no obligation to solicit feedback . . . and no
obligation to reveal who influenced his decision or what information he
considered in reaching it.”92 This means the President could invoke many of
these emergency powers based on little more than a whim or a political
inclination. Professor Kovacs recognized that even Justice
Kagan acknowledged this danger but thought that judicial review would provide
an adequate backstop. [Justice Kagan] contended that Franklin v.
Massachusetts’ holding that the President is not an “agency” under the APA
should not apply when the President “step[s] into the shoes of an agency head.”
Even if that distinction were upheld, however, and enabled some APA suits
against the President, applying the rulemaking provisions of the APA to the
President would be another battle.93

Thus, without the constraints of the APA, a president’s unilateral
decision-making could suffer from a lack of transparency and deliberation in
her unbridled discretion.
3. Limited Judicial Review
In addition to eliminating a requirement of agency expertise and the
rulemaking requirements of the APA, unilateral delegations to the President
also compromise the reviewability of these presidential decisions. This is
because the Judicial Branch often takes a tentative approach to judicial
review of the President’s actions, according her great deference, particularly
where national security is involved.94 This leads to at least two negative
consequences for external judicial checks on presidential action.

90
Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 101 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Franklin,
505 U.S. at 801); accord Dettling v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128–29 (D. Haw. 2013);
Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 801 F. Supp. 2d 383, 403 (D. Md. 2011),
aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012).
91
Gilman, supra note 71, at 362.
92
Kovacs, supra note 55, at 563.
93
Id. at 566 (footnotes omitted).
94
But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (limiting power of
the President to seize steel mills even in the face of national security concerns).
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First, the Supreme Court has yet to agree upon the proper level of
deference for presidential statutory interpretations, as opposed to agency
statutory interpretations. The Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine governs
much of statutory interpretation, providing a two-part test for review of an
agency’s interpretation of a statute, with significant deference given to the
agency.95 Whereas the Supreme Court has made clear that Chevron and its
progeny apply to agency actions, thus providing a standard of review, the
courts are very unclear about the standard of review for a president’s
interpretations. The Supreme Court in Franklin v. Massachusetts not only
declined to apply the traditional Chevron deference to the President’s
interpretation of a statute—the Court also failed to provide an alternative
standard of review.96 This leaves a critical void in the jurisprudence, allowing
inconsistencies to develop in the doctrine.97
Second, the closer the link to national security, the less likely courts are
to engage in substantive judicial review. As Professor Stack and I have
described elsewhere, this leads to broad deference to a president’s statutory
actions, particularly where there is no agreement on the relevant standard of
review.98 For instance, in Dalton v. Specter, the Supreme Court noted that
“longstanding authority holds that such review is not available when the
statute in question commits the decision to the discretion of the President.”99
As Professor Kovacs has indicated, even “agencies may ask the President to
establish policy himself to avoid the burden of rulemaking and to make it
more difficult for adversaries to challenge the policy in court.”100
Furthermore, some security statutes specifically waive judicial review
of presidential emergency powers. Notably, the Defense Production Act
specifically provides that neither the President’s actions to suspend
transactions, nor her findings supporting that decision, are “subject to
judicial review.”101 Congress has waived judicial review of the President’s
95
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). The Supreme Court
in Chevron established a two-part test for review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. At Step
One, the court asks whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If
not, the analysis proceeds to Step Two, where the court merely asks “whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
96
505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
97
See Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–18.
98
Id. at 1203; Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 267, 299–300.
99
511 U.S. 462, 464, 474 (1994) (finding review unavailable where Congress committed “the
decision to the discretion of the President” under 10 U.S.C. § 2687).
100
Kovacs, supra note 55, at 55758 (documenting examples of presidential actions that may have
been inspired in part by a desire to bypass rulemaking).
101
50 U.S.C. § 4565(e) (“[A]ctions of the President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) and the
findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d) shall not be subject to judicial review.”).
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actions in other contexts, including the ability to finance cleanup of
contaminated sites,102 to compensate government employees injured by
hostile action,103 and to designate items as defense items for import or
export.104
Judicial review remains the most likely opportunity for providing a
check on a presidential statutory interpretation, but the lack of a defined
deference standard—combined with historical deference to the executive on
national security matters—neutralizes the hope that the judiciary will serve
as an effective external constraint.
C. An Executive Delegations Matrix
Unfortunately, despite these competing justifications for and against
unilateral presidential authority over emergencies, actual delegations often
exist in a “black box,” with little in the statute’s text or legislative history to
conclusively determine the “why” behind Congress’s choice of delegation.105
Without explicit guidance to better understand the choice of delegation, this
Article undertakes an exhaustive search of the delegations of emergency
powers in the U.S. Code to see if there is any discernible pattern that exists
to explain this choice. The analysis is primarily focused on provisions that
refer to an “emergency” power for the President or an agency head.106
In a few rare instances, however, Congress has imposed record requirements and an arbitrary and
capricious standard to the President. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1)–(2) (“In any judicial action under this chapter,
judicial review of any issues concerning the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the
President shall be limited to the administrative record. Otherwise applicable principles of administrative
law shall govern whether any supplemental materials may be considered by the court . . . . In considering
objections raised in any judicial action under this chapter, the court shall uphold the President’s decision
in selecting the response action unless the objecting party can demonstrate, on the administrative record,
that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). As I argue
elsewhere, such procedural constraints could be more widely imposed. See Stein, supra note 3, at 1220–
44.
102
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(2).
103
5 U.S.C. § 5570(d).
104
22 U.S.C. § 2778(h). Congress has waived judicial review of agency actions in more limited
situations, related to discrete actions such as estimates and reports, 2 U.S.C. § 1571, use of alternate
dispute resolutions, 5 U.S.C. § 581, and the establishment of committees, id. § 570.
105
See Lemos, supra note 30, at 36466.
106
Our research was inspired by a Brennan Center report’s identification of national security
provisions. See BRENNAN REPORT, supra note 29. The Brennan Center’s report only focused on the 123
provisions that can be activated by a president’s declaration of a national emergency under one of the
four enabling statutes. This does not capture all statutory emergency provisions. For a more
comprehensive review, we ran an independent search of the U.S. Code titles in Westlaw and used the
following key word search: (“emergency”) /s (“Secretary” OR “Department” OR “Administrator” OR
“President”). This keyword search should only generate statutes that include a provision discussing
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Specifically, these provisions were reviewed for the nature of the agency–
presidential interaction that Congress envisioned, including only those where
we could determine whether the agency had a primary, shared, or no
responsibility for emergency powers.107 This culled search resulted in 188
“emergency” provisions that are provided in Appendix B.
The data could be divided and analyzed in a number of ways, an
endeavor that is complicated by the fact that some emergency statutory
provisions merely “activate” or “unlock” other provisions, some emergency
provisions are dependent on such emergency declarations, and some
statutory provisions allow for independent emergency powers.108 Another
challenge is defining what is meant by unilateral powers. For purposes of
this analysis, unilateral presidential powers are those where the President has
sole authority to both activate and implement powers in an emergency.
Unilateral agency powers, on the other hand, are only classified as such
where the agency has the sole authority to implement emergency powers and
they are not dependent on the President to unlock them.
Similarly complicated, some emergency powers are shared by both the
President and an agency. For purposes of this Article, any emergency power
emergencies in the same sentence as the President or agency heads. While this search was compared to
the Brennan Center’s report to ensure those provisions were captured, it resulted in additional provisions.
To ensure we captured as many energy provisions as possible, we then ran additional searches specific to
the two primary energy agencies, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the
Department of Energy (DOE), using the keyword search: (“emergency”) /p (“Secretary of Energy” OR
“Department of Energy” OR “Federal Energy Regulatory Commission” OR “FERC” OR “DOE”). See
infra Appendix B for the results of this search with energy provisions highlighted in grey.
107
Because of our focus on the interaction between the President and an agency to respond to an
emergency (as compared to preparing or recovering from an emergency), statutes were disregarded in our
search if they: (1) did not explicitly state which executive entity, the President or the agency, had the
power to declare an emergency; (2) did not specify which entity could exercise the emergency power; (3)
were “passive” emergency statutes (for example, statutes that automatically waive provisions in an
emergency); (4) were no longer good law; or (5) only discussed the establishment of emergency plans.
This resulted in a few less provisions than were included in the Brennan Center’s report. Those left out
from the Brennan Center’s report most often fell under the first and third caveats, or the emergency
declaration power could only be exercised by Congress. We only considered Congress’s delegation, not
subsequent delegations. We did not include the temporary emergency provisions contained in the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act that allows agency administrators to take
some temporary action in response to the pandemic and the President’s declaration of a national
emergency. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 9008. Notably, this does not cover statutory provisions that only contain
the word “emergency” (e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5159) nor regulations that
provide for emergency powers (e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 10.13).
108
Some statutory emergency provisions are only activated after the President or relevant Secretary
has declared an “emergency” under one of four statutes: the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–51, the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, id. §§ 5121–5208, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2318(a)(1). These four provisions are listed at the end of Appendix B.
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that could not always be implemented unilaterally was classified as a “shared
power.” That means that shared powers come in many varieties, including
joint-consent requirements and consultation requirements. Furthermore,
shared powers often involve a sequential ordering of authority, with an
agency often being empowered to act only after a presidential declaration of
an emergency.
It should be noted that Appendix B contains the citations but not the
text or full analysis for some additional provisions. Independent research
identified some emergency provisions that were not captured by the initial
“emergency” search because Congress used the term “national security” or
“imminent and substantial endangerment” instead of “emergency” to justify
the powers. The search was expanded to include these provisions,109 resulting
in an additional 185 provisions and bringing the grand total to 373
emergency provisions in the U.S. Code that address federal agency or
presidential powers.110 Congress’s diversity of approaches to delegating such
emergency powers resulted in four categories—119 that provide unilateral
power to the President, 163 that provide unilateral power to an agency, 80
that provide for shared powers, and 11 that provide emergency authority to
a nonfederal entity or limit federal executive action.
Numbers do not tell the whole story, however. Although this may sound
like Congress delegates more authority to agencies than to the President, the
overwhelming majority of substantive powers lie with the President and the
overwhelming majority of ministerial powers lie with an agency.111
Examples will be discussed below, but to provide a flavor, the President is
allowed to unilaterally take control of private facilities, prohibit transactions,
and affect liberties, while agencies are allowed to address employment
issues, transfers of resources, records, funding, and grant waivers and
exemptions to their regulations.
109
To be more comprehensive, we ran two additional searches using the following key word
searches: (“national security”) /s (“Secretary” OR “Department” OR “Administrator” OR “President”)
and (“imminent and substantial endangerment”) /s (“Secretary” OR “Department” OR “Administrator”
OR “President”). If emergency powers exist that do not use the words “emergency,” “national security,”
or “imminent and substantial endangerment” in the text of the provision, it would not have been captured
by this search. This process could proceed indefinitely as there are numerous ways that Congress can
provide a president power to deal with an emergency without using the search terms identified. See, for
example, The Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 252, which provides the President the power to call federal
military to service “as he considers necessary to enforce” federal laws “to suppress” a rebellion. Most
would agree that this provision qualifies as an emergency provision, but it is not captured in any of our
searches. See infra Appendix B for the citations that resulted from these additional searches.
110
The “national security” and “imminent” provisions were sorted into the four quadrants identified
in Appendix B. The text of those relevant to energy are included in Appendix A.
111
See infra Sections I.C.1–I.C.2.
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This Section deconstructs Congress’s options for delegating emergency
executive powers to either the President, an agency, or some mixture of the
two, resulting in four possible combinations of presidential/agency
powers:112
 Strong President/Weak Agency (unilateral presidential
authority)
 Weak President/Strong Agency (unilateral agency authority)
 Weak President/Weak Agency (nonexecutive authority)
 Strong President/Strong Agency (shared executive authority)
The labels of “strong” and “weak” refer to the literal language of the
statute, regardless of whether that entity actually exerts this strength or
weakness. Rather, a strong label reflects the power to declare or act upon a
declared emergency and a weak label reflects no such power. Each
combination assumes certain tradeoffs related to the costs and benefits of
presidential and agency powers, and examples of actual statutory provisions
for each of the four combinations are provided below.
1. Strong President/Weak Agency (Unilateral Presidential)
Congress often favors the Strong President/Weak Agency combination
when delegating substantive emergency powers. 119 of the 373 total
emergency powers we found provided unilateral power to the President
without any required input from expert agencies.113 Such Strong
President/Weak Agency delegations allow for expedited responses but suffer
from the short-term accountability problems that result from a lack of checks
and balances and judicial review.114
Not surprisingly, these emergency powers are often prompted by
national security concerns. Based on our research,115 we found that almost

112
Kevin M. Stack, The Priority of Statutory Interpreters Within the Executive Branch: The
President, the Agency, and Congress’ Choice of Delegate, 31 ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 9, 9–10 (2006)
(building upon Professor Stack’s division of the world of statutory delegations into three distinct
categories: (1) mixed agency–President delegations that provide power to the agency with some form of
presidential consultation; (2) simple delegations that provide power solely to an agency; and (3)
presidential delegations that provide power solely to the President).
113
See infra Appendix B.
114
See supra Sections I.A–I.B (discussing the pros and cons of unilateral presidential delegations).
115
For our research method, see supra notes 106–109.
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all116 of the emergency provisions in Title 10 (Armed Forces),117 Title 22
(Foreign Relations and Intercourse),118 and Title 50 (War and National
Defense)119 regarded national security, were dependent on an emergency
declaration from the President, and delegated the subsequent emergency
powers to the President. Most importantly, these powers are often
exceptionally broad with far-reaching effects. For example, Congress has
provided that “[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or
of any class of aliens . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, he may [impose] . . . any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate,”120 and that “[i]n light of the potential for terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the President shall
take immediate action.”121 Although these national security delegations could
be justified by the President’s Article II powers as Commander in Chief,122
this rationale does not justify other areas where the President enjoys absolute
unilateral emergency powers. As will be discussed below in Part III,
although Congress provides the President with unilateral powers to address
a few isolated emergencies in areas such as agriculture,123 transportation,124
116
There were some exceptions for minor tasks. See 10 U.S.C. § 1491(e) (Secretary of Defense may
waive any requirements with respect to funeral honors for veterans); 22 U.S.C. § 2703 (Secretary may
establish and maintain emergency commissary or mess services in places abroad where, in the judgment
of the Secretary, such services are necessary).
117
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 12006(a) (the President may suspend the operation of statutes governing
the authorized strengths and distribution of reserve officers in an active status in the armed forces); id.
§ 123b (the President may waive statutory restrictions on using Department of Defense funding); id.
§ 712(a)(3) (the President may detail members of the armed forces to assist any country that he considers
it advisable to assist in the interest of national defense); id. § 603 (the President may temporarily appoint
any qualified person to any officer grade).
118
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1) (the President can reduce size of military if he deems it
necessary); id. § 4103 (the President may suspend any provision of this subchapter with respect to any
post, bureau, office, or activity of the Department, if the President determines that the suspension is
necessary in the interest of national security because of an emergency); id. § 8910 (the President may
block all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person).
119
See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1515 (the President may suspend the operation of provisions regulating the
storage, transportation, disposal, procurement, handling, and testing of chemical and biological weapons,
including the prohibition on testing such weapons on human subjects); id. § 4560(e) (the President may
provide for the establishment and training of a “nucleus executive reserve” for employment in executive
positions in government).
120
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
121
50 U.S.C. § 2311.
122
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
123
7 U.S.C. § 5712(c) (“[T]he President may prohibit or curtail the export of any agricultural
commodity during a period for which the President has declared a national emergency . . . .”).
124
49 U.S.C. § 44908(b) (“The President may waive this subsection if the President decides, and
reports to Congress, that the waiver is required because of national security interests or a humanitarian
emergency.”).
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labor,125 and telecommunications,126 they pale in comparison to the surprising
amount of unilateral power provided to the President to address energy
emergencies.127
2. Weak President/Strong Agency (Unilateral Agency)
To counteract this unilateral presidential power, Congress sometimes
delegates emergency powers to an agency without requiring any direct input
from the President.128 Of the 373 total emergency powers we found, 163 gave
almost unilateral power to an agency to act in times of an emergency.129 Such
Weak President/Strong Agency delegations allow for more involvement of
expertise, but suffer from a more bureaucratic path that may limit
expediency.
Emergency powers in this quadrant are often highly specific and
technical and use the agency’s expertise in the area. Our research found that
the most prominent areas where agencies have strong delegation and
emergency powers were in Title 21 (Food and Drugs) and Title 16
(Conservation).130 Most notably, Congress has provided the Secretary of
Health and Human Services with the sole authority to determine that a
public-health emergency exists,131 a power that Secretary Azar used to
address the COVID-19 pandemic weeks before President Trump declared a

125
29 U.S.C. § 176 (“Whenever in the opinion of the President of the United States, a threatened or
actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication . . . imperil the national health or
safety . . . .”); see also 46 U.S.C. § 8103(h)(1)–(2) (permitting the President to suspend citizenship and
nationality requirements for officers and seamen on documented U.S. vessels during a proclaimed
national emergency or “when the needs of commerce require”).
126
47 U.S.C. § 606(c) (stating that the President may, if he deems it necessary in the interest of
national security or defense, suspend or amend regulations applicable to stations or devices capable of
emitting electromagnetic radiations, etc.).
127
See infra Appendix A.
128
See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-SoUnitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1005 (2001) (“The confirmation process often is used by members
of the Senate to obtain assurances from prospective agency heads that they will implement the authorities
entrusted to them with some degree of independence from the president’s political preferences.”); Stack,
Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 268 (arguing that “grants of authority to agency officials alone, absent
such conditions, do not authorize the President to act or to bind the discretion of lower-level officials,”
but instead that “the statutory grants of authority to an official (alone) should be read as vesting the official
with an independent duty and discretion, not a legal duty to the President”).
129
See infra Appendix B.
130
See infra Appendix B (Weak President/Strong Agency) and infra Section III.A.I for a discussion
of the environmental and food-and-drug emergency statutes.
131
Public Health Service Act § 319, 42 U.S.C. § 247d.
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national emergency.132 Among other delegations to agency experts in
housing and banking,133 Congress also has provided the Secretary of
Agriculture with sole authority to “undertake emergency [watershed
protection] measures . . . as the Secretary deems necessary to safeguard lives
and property from floods”134 and the Secretary of Interior with the power to
“determine[] that an emergency situation exists . . . to assure the continued
viability of a particular fish or wildlife population.”135
3. Weak President/Weak Agency (Nonexecutive)
The Weak President/Weak Agency delegations reflect the worst of both
worlds with respect to a federal response. This would involve emergencies
over which the federal executive has no control. Fortunately, such Weak
President/Weak Agency delegations are generally only theoretical, as
delegations that did not provide the federal Executive Branch with
emergency authority would not be effective in responding to national
emergencies. Where both presidential and agency Executive Branch
delegations are weak or nonexistent, Congress tends to choose to
alternatively delegate outside of the Executive Branch to courts or states.136
Our search resulted in only eleven provisions that fit this category, all of
which provide a nonexecutive entity, such as a state governor, with
emergency authority.137 Such emergency delegations have proven useful,
however, in responding to emergencies that are isolated to one state or
emergencies relating specifically to state law issues. For instance, Congress
has delegated power to the governor of a state to declare an emergency
related to transportation and power plants.138
132
See Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TDL2-NHH6]; Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69.
133
See infra Appendix A.
134
16 U.S.C. § 2203.
135
Id. § 3126. Additionally, although it is only a plan for an emergency (and so not included in
Appendix A), Congress also requires the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
“recommend a Federal agency or agencies to be responsible for . . . protecting the United States from a
near-Earth object that is expected to collide with Earth.” 51 U.S.C. § 71103(2)(A).
136
See Lemos, supra note 30, at 370–73 (comparing delegation to courts and agencies); see also
33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (stating that while the Administrator determines whether any pollution presents an
“imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons,” the district court has the final say in
deciding whether an injunction should be issued to stop the pollution).
137
See infra Appendix B (Weak President/Weak Agency).
138
See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1) (“Upon application by the owner or operator of a fuel burning
stationary source . . . the Governor of the State in which such source is located may petition the President
to determine that a national or regional energy emergency exists . . . .” (emphasis added)); 49 U.S.C.
§ 5324(a)(2) (stating that emergency powers relating to public transportation are unlocked when “the
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4. Strong President/Strong Agency (Shared Executive)
That leaves the Strong President/Strong Agency combination as the
theoretical sweet spot of emergency delegation tradeoffs. Such delegations
may require some more bureaucratic hoops than a unilateral delegation to
the President, but the inclusion of an expert agency can lead to an enhanced
outcome in terms of a more informed judgment, a more accountable
decision-making process, and an avenue for judicial review.139 Our research
resulted in eighty of these shared delegations, sixty-three of which were
analyzed as “emergency” provisions that were categorized for the method of
shared power. The bulk of these shared emergency delegations (44/63)
reflect an agency authorized to implement authority only after a president
has activated it. In many ways, these provisions could still be characterized
as unilateral presidential authority because the agency cannot act without
approval of the President. But there are also several (11/63) emergency
provisions that can be activated by the agency or the President.140 Although
this places an agency on more of an equal footing with the President, because
either entity can still act unilaterally, neither can provide a check on the other.
One approach to this dilemma could be to develop shared executive
frameworks that impose something more akin to joint consent, requiring
each entity (the President and the agency) to make its own emergency
declaration before emergency powers are unlocked under the statute, as
Congress did in a public-health statute.141 While providing a useful intraexecutive check, the trick here is to formulate a statutory formulation that
requires a president to take an expert agency’s findings into account, but not
Governor of a State has declared an emergency and the Secretary has concurred; or . . . the President has
declared a major disaster under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act” (citation omitted)).
139
See supra Sections I.A–I.B. Delegations to agencies do not necessarily mean more procedural
requirements, as Congress has occasionally waived notice-and-comment requirements for an agency. See,
e.g., sources cited supra note 139.
140
See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (allowing either a presidential or Health and Human Services
emergency to activate the powers of the Secretary to furnish medical care to those affected by the
emergency); 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-83 (allowing the same alternative declaration by the President or the
Secretary to declare an emergency and stating that “[t]he term ‘emergency period’ means the period in
which there exists . . . an emergency or disaster declared by the President pursuant to the National
Emergencies Act or the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; or . . . a public
health emergency declared by the Secretary” (emphasis added)).
141
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(g)(1) (“[A]n ‘emergency period’ is the period during which, there
exists . . . an emergency or disaster declared by the President pursuant to the National Emergencies Act
or the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; and . . . a public health
emergency declared by the Secretary . . . .”(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 95(a)
(defining an emergency period as “such emergency period as the President of the United States by
proclamation may prescribe”).
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allow an agency to effectively veto or hold up a declaration or
implementation of needed emergency powers.
This formulation could result in slower responses, however, suggesting
another model may be found in the provisions that require the President and
the agency to consult with one another before acting, as Congress did in two
key provisions. In the first provision, Congress provided that “[u]pon the
declaration by the President of a disaster in an insular area, the President,
acting through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, shall assess, in cooperation with the Secretary and chief executive
of such insular area.”142 In the second provision, Congress provided that
“[w]henever the President after consultation with and receiving advice from
the National Security Resources Board determines that it is in the interest of
the national security for the Government to obtain prompt delivery of any
articles or materials . . . he is authorized, through the head of any
Government agency . . . [to] order for such quantity . . . the President deems
appropriate.”143 Although few shared powers reflect more of this true
partnership model between the President and an agency head, under this true
sweet-spot model, the risk of rash unilateral actions is extinguished while
expertise, accountability, and judicial review are maintained. Where
appropriate, Congress could even waive certain procedural requirements that
would otherwise apply to the agency in exchange for the intra-executive
check that would occur. This combination is explored in more detail in Part
III.
To help visualize these four combinations, I developed an Executive
Delegations Matrix, as well as highlighted a few representative examples for
each delegation within each of the four quadrants:

142

42 U.S.C. § 5204b(a) (emphasis added).
50 U.S.C. § 3816(a) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This stronger language may make it
more difficult for the President to comply with the letter of the consultation requirement while
nevertheless ignoring the advice of their expert agencies.
143
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FIGURE 1: SAMPLE SUBJECT MATTERS WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE DELEGATIONS MATRIX

- Armed Forces
Strong

- Foreign Relations
- War
- Energy

- Disaster in

Insular Area
- Delivery of
Needed Goods

PRESIDENTIAL
CONTROL

Weak

- State Public
Transportation
- State Power Plants

Weak

- Environmental
- Food and Drug

Strong

AGENCY CONTROL

II. PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ENERGY STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Scholars have evaluated general emergency powers in a number of
contexts, including the power of states to act in times of crisis,144 the
suspension of constitutional constraints on government action,145
administrative law adjustments in response to emergencies,146 small
emergencies,147
accommodating
emergencies,148
an
emergency
constitution,149 the check and balances at work on a president’s general

144

Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 241–57 (2006).
Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case
Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 183–87 (2020).
146
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096–97
(2009).
147
Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 844–45 (2006).
148
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 609–
10 (2003).
149
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030–31 (2004) (arguing
legislatures should not defer to the executive just because there is an emergency).
145
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emergency powers in times of crisis,150 and empirical work documenting the
rise of federal emergency power and the associated tradeoffs.151 One category
of statutory emergency powers that is often overlooked, however, is
emergency energy powers.152 Given the fact that future energy emergencies
are likely to involve the electric grid, this analysis drills down into
emergency energy powers related to the electric grid and refers to them as
“emergency grid powers.” As seen in Appendix A, even though Congress
has provided the majority of domestic energy emergency powers to expert
agencies, it has delegated substantive emergency grid powers to the
President, placing them squarely in the Strong President/Weak Agency
classification generally reserved for foreign affairs. In fact, almost 50% of
all the unilateral emergency grid powers are provided to the President while
only 15% of unilateral emergency grid powers are provided to an agency.153
Therefore, this Part identifies the primary emergency energy statutory
provisions, analyzing the extent of these powers, what is required to unlock
these powers, and their past uses. Some of these powers stem from
generalized statutes that are broad enough to encompass energy emergencies,
which I have labeled “general presidential emergency energy powers,” since
all of the general provisions give powers unilaterally to the President. Other
emergency energy powers stem from specific energy statutes, which I have
labeled “specific presidential emergency energy powers.” These forty-two
emergency energy provisions are in Appendix A.154
150
See generally Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During
the Pandemic (Univ. of Chi., Pub. L. Working Paper No. 757, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3608974
[https://perma.cc/XDP4-Q8P7]; Joshua L. Friedman, Emergency Powers of the Executive: The
President’s Authority When All Hell Breaks Loose, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 265 (2012) (discussing the
President’s general emergency powers).
151
Boliek, supra note 11, at 3349–71; see also Ball, supra note 66, at 912.
152
The search for emergency energy provisions did not include those statutory provisions that
addressed emergency planning. Instead, it only included provisions about responding to an actual
emergency. See supra notes 107–109 for a description of the process for identifying these provisions.
153
See infra Appendix A.
154
Notably, this analysis does not include the War Labor Dispute Act, which Congress enacted in
1943 (and repealed in 1947) to provide presidents with statutory authorization to seize businesses or
activities stalled by labor controversies. Ludwig Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1947). These explicit statutory authorities are part of what distinguished President
Truman’s attempted seizure of the steel industry in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 586–87 (1952), which limited the power of the President to seize steel mills—even in the face of
national security concerns—in the absence of explicit statutory authority. Relevant to energy, this
emergency power was used three times. On May 1, 1943, President Roosevelt seized the soft-coal mines
after 500,000 miners went on strike. Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 Fed. Reg. 5695 (May 1, 1943); Peter Kihss,
Seizure of Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1978, at A16. On May 3, 1945, President Truman ordered the
Secretary of Interior to seize the anthracite coal mines. Exec. Order No. 9548, 10 Fed. Reg. 5025 (May
3, 1945) (“[B]y virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United
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A. General Presidential Emergency Energy Powers
Included among the broad delegations in generalized statutes that
Congress has made to the President in the name of national security,155
Congress has also delegated substantial authority to the President to ensure
sufficient domestic supplies of critical resources, including energy. Two
such statutes that contemplate unilateral control over energy resources are
discussed here: (1) the Defense Production Act (DPA),156 and (2) the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).157 The presidential
powers under the DPA can be used upon the requisite conditions below, but
the powers under the IEEPA can only be activated upon a national
emergency declaration.158
1. The Defense Production Act
In 1950, Congress enacted the DPA to ensure the security of the United
States by supporting “the vitality of the domestic industrial base.”159
Although it has been invoked by many administrations for various reasons,160
including addressing the supply of personal protective equipment during the
recent COVID-19 pandemic,161 it contains four key provisions that grant the
President unilateral authority to prioritize contracts and orders in times of an
energy emergency. The first three are found in § 101 and provide for the
President to prioritize contracts. Section 101(a)(1) authorizes the President
to “require that performance under contracts or orders . . . which he deems
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense . . . take priority.”162

States, including Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 892) as amended
by the War Labor Disputes Act (57 Stat. 163) . . . .”). And on May 21, 1946, he ordered seizure of the
bituminous mines to end a forty-day strike. Exec. Order No. 9728, 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (May 21, 1946);
Kihss, supra, at A16. The subsequent Labor Management Relations Act does not provide any similar
seizure authority for a president. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 141. See also Teller, supra, at 1017.
155
See generally BRENNAN REPORT, supra note 29, at 1. See also Stein, supra note 3, at 1193–95.
156
50 U.S.C. § 4501.
157
Id. §§ 1701–06.
158
See id. § 1701(a) (“Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be
exercised . . . if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”).
159
Id. § 4502(a)(2).
160
See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Construction and Application of the Defense Production Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2061 et seq., and Its Regulations, 8 A.L.R. FED. 3D, § 5 (2016) (detailing cases
challenging actions taken under the Defense Production Act); CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE DEFENSE
PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, at Summary (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43767.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SX65-38KB].
161
Memorandum on Order Under the Defense Production Act Regarding 3M Company, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-order-defenseproduction-act-regarding-3m-company/ [https://perma.cc/28X3-KZJG].
162
50 U.S.C. § 4511(a)(1).
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The DPA defines the “national defense” as “programs for military and
energy production or construction, military or critical infrastructure
assistance to any foreign nation, homeland security, stockpiling, space, and
any directly related activity,” meaning the President could use this authority
to promote energy production or construction without any reference to
foreign nations, war, or typical national security areas.163 Section 101(a)(2)
then authorizes the President “to allocate materials, services, and facilities in
such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense.”164 Congress
prohibits such reallocations of materials in the civilian market, unless there
is no other alternative to preserve the national defense.165 Lastly, § 101(c)
authorizes the President to allocate and prioritize contracts relating to
materials, equipment, and services to maximize domestic energy supplies in
certain circumstances.166
Although Congress made this unilateral delegation to the President, it
also provided that the President could delegate such powers to the relevant
agency.167 In 1975, the President did just that and delegated this authority to
the Department of Energy (DOE).168 Since then, the agency has used this
emergency authority for energy issues only a few times. First, the DOE used
the DPA § 101(c) authority in 1975 during the construction of the TransAlaska Pipeline to help those building the Pipeline obtain materials on a
priority basis.169 Second, the DOE used the DPA in 2001 “to ensure that

163

Id. § 4552(14) (emphasis added).
Id. § 4511(a)(2).
165
Id. § 4511(b).
166
Id. § 4511(c).
167
Id.
168
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 160, at Summary (“The authorities of the DPA are generally
afforded to the President in the statute. The President, in turn, has delegated these authorities to
department and agency heads in Executive Order 13603, National Defense Resource Preparedness,
issued in 2012.”). Functions of the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950 relating to
production, conservation, use, control, distribution, and allocation of energy, were delegated to Secretary
of Energy. See Exec. Order No. 11,790, 39 Fed. Reg. 23,185 (June 25, 1974). This information is also set
out as a note under § 761 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
169
JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 4 (citing COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: TRANS-ALASKA OIL PIPELINE—PROGRESS OF
CONSTRUCTION THROUGH NOVEMBER 1975, at 2324 (1976)); see also Trans-Alaska Pipeline Priorities
Assistance for Construction, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,608 (Sept. 23, 1974); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Priorities
Assistance for Construction, 40 Fed. Reg. at 26–27 (Dec. 30, 1974); id. at 5409; id. at 19,238; TransAlaska Pipeline Priorities Assistance for Construction, 41 Fed. Reg. 44,476–77 (Oct. 4, 1976); id. at
53,391.
164
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emergency supplies of natural gas continued to flow to California utilities,
helping to avoid threatened electrical blackouts.”170
The last DPA emergency provision, § 721, also known as the “ExonFlorio Amendment,” relates to the review of existing contracts and
authorizes the President to “suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”171 The
President has a certain time limit within which to take such action172 and
Congress only allows the President to take such action if she makes two
findings: (1) credible evidence that leads the President to believe that a
foreign person’s investment “threatens to impair the national security”; and
(2) other laws “do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate
and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security.”173
Congress, furthermore, demands that the President consider eleven listed
factors in making such findings, including “the potential national securityrelated effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major
energy assets” and the “long-term projection of United States requirements
for sources of energy and other critical resources and material.”174 The DPA
further created an Executive Branch committee, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury, to review such transactions and submit their recommendations to
the President.175

170
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 160, at 9 (citing The California Energy Crisis and Use of the
Defense Production Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 107th Cong. (2001)
(DOE ordered natural gas sellers to keep supplying utility Pacific Gas & Electric as it neared insolvency
during the state’s energy crisis). President Obama also invoked it to assist the Navy’s Great Green
Fleet of biofuel-powered ships in 2012. See Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet:
Obama Administration Announces Additional Steps to Increase Energy Security (Apr. 11, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/11/fact-sheet-obama-administrationannounces-additional-steps-increase-ener [https://perma.cc/53LE-DF34].
171
50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1).
172
Id. § 4565(d)(2).
173
Id. § 4565(d)(4).
174
Id. § 4565(f)(6), (10). These factors are: domestic production needs; availability of domestic
industries to meet national defense requirements; the extent to which foreign control affects the ability to
meet national defense requirements; effects on military sales to other countries, domestic international
technological leadership, critical infrastructure, and critical technologies; whether it is a foreigngovernment-controlled transaction; compliance with treaties and the relationship between the United
States and the foreign nation; domestic energy needs; and any other factors the President deems
“appropriate.” Id. § 4565(f).
175
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investmentin-the-united-states-cfius [https://perma.cc/B4Q4-HC94]; Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv.,
758 F.3d. 296, 30102 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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This § 721 authority has only been used a few times. President Obama
used it once to prohibit foreign investment in a wind farm and once to prevent
foreign investment in a semiconductor corporation.176 President Trump has
used it at least twice during his presidency, once to prevent foreign
investment in semiconductor corporations177 and once to prevent foreign
investment in a global technology corporation.178 There also may have been
other instances where foreign investors abandoned potential acquisitions of
U.S. mining corporations because of early concerns raised by CFIUS.179
2. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
Congress also delegated substantial unilateral powers to the President
under the IEEPA, a statute that confers broad authority to regulate financial
and other commercial transactions involving designated entities, including
the power to impose sanctions on individuals and countries.180 Unlike the
DPA, the emergency provisions of the IEEPA may only be activated by a
president’s declaration of a national emergency.181 Section 203 of the IEEPA
provides the President with the sole power to “investigate, regulate, or
prohibit” any foreign transactions, foreign transfers of credit or payments, or
import or export of currency or securities, and block any transportation,
176
Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 301–02; Press Release, The White House, Presidential Order -Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of a Controlling Interest in Aixtron SE by Grand Chip Investment
GMBH (Dec. 2, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/02/presidentialorder-regarding-proposed-acquisition-controlling-interest [https://perma.cc/W7S2-GKFJ].
177
Press Release, The White House, Statement from the Press Secretary on President Donald J.
Trump’s Decision Regarding Lattice Semiconductor Corporation (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-president-donald-j-trumpsdecision-regarding-lattice-semiconductor-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/399Y-U4X3] (citing the
national security risk as “the potential transfer of intellectual property to the foreign acquirer, the Chinese
government’s role in supporting this transaction”).
178
Other Presidential Documents, 2019 C.F.R. 909, 921–22; Press Release, Sec’y Mnuchin,
Statement on the President’s Decision Regarding Broadcom’s Takeover Attempt of Qualcomm (Mar. 12,
2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0309
[https://perma.cc/XXA7-XHT8]
(explaining that because of the “sensitivities” of the transaction, the President did not explain his
reasoning for blocking the transaction); see also Timeline: Broadcom-Qualcomm Saga Comes to an
Abrupt End (Mar. 14, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcomtimeline/timeline-broadcom-qualcomm-saga-comes-to-an-abrupt-end-idUSKCN1GQ22N
[https://perma.cc/922N-W84P].
179
See Darshak S. Dholakia, Impact of Growing Global Investment Controls on the Mining Sector,
63 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20A-1, 20A-56 (2017) (discussing how potential acquisitions of mining
operations were abandoned after CFIUS raised concerns during review).
180
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1).
181
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 and 18 U.S.C. § 4565); CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE
(2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QN9-BTHP].
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importation, or other actions involving any property in which any foreign
country has an interest.182 Therefore, if a petroleum shortage is sufficiently
severe to invoke a presidentially declared national emergency, the IEEPA
could be used to control supplies of petroleum products in which foreign
countries or foreign nationals have an “interest.”183
Congress imposed a few limitations on this power. First, § 202 provides
that the President may use this authority only to deal with “any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to
such threat.”184 Second, § 204 provides that “[t]he President, in every
possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of
the authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly with the
Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.”185 The House report also
suggests that the President is not allowed to regulate wholly domestic
transactions.186
Presidents have frequently relied upon the IEEPA when declaring
national emergencies, including for investigating foreign interference in
elections,187 securing the information and communications technology and
services supply chain,188 and even for preventing financial support for
international investigations into American war crimes in Afghanistan.189 In
the energy realm, President Obama relied in part on the IEEPA to support

182

50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1).
Id.
184
Id. § 1701.
185
Id. § 1703(a).
186
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LEGAL AUTHORITIES AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO A
SEVERE ENERGY SUPPLY INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 681 (1982) (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10–11 (1977); and then citing
S. REP. NO. 95-466, at 5 (1977)), https://www.justice.gov/file/23221/download [https://perma.cc/DF4TFNW2].
187
See supra notes 53–54; see also Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg 46,843 (Sept. 12, 2018)
(detailing President Trump’s national emergency declaration regarding foreign interference in the U.S.
election).
188
Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019) (securing the information and
communications technology and services supply chain).
189
Exec. Order No. 13,930, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139 (June 11, 2020) (prohibiting the contribution of
funds, goods, or services to any foreign person to have “directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to
investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any personnel of a country that is an ally of the United States
without the consent of that country’s government”).
183
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his executive order on cybersecurity.190 Similarly, President Trump used it to
limit petroleum-product imports from Iran,191 and to cut ties with Venezuela
in part because Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, “degrade[s]
Venezuela’s infrastructure and natural environment through economic
mismanagement and confiscatory mining and industrial practices.”192
Most recently, President Trump used the IEEPA to issue an executive
order prohibiting the acquisition, transfer, or installation of any bulk-power
system193 electric equipment manufactured or supplied “by persons owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction . . . of a foreign adversary”
that “poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or resiliency
of United States critical infrastructure or the economy of the United
States.”194 While it is imperative to protect the security of the bulk-power
system, the executive order is exceptionally broad and potentially retroactive
(it applies to all pending and future transactions).195 The executive order does
recognize that expertise to respond to such emergencies lies in the expert
energy agencies, with President Trump delegating his IEEPA authority to
respond to the emergency to the Secretary of Energy and requiring the
Secretary of Energy to coordinate and consult with other agency heads such
as the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Interior.196
B. Specific Presidential Emergency Energy Powers
Congress has also delegated substantial authority over energy-grid
emergencies to the President within specific energy statutes.197 This Section
discusses three such energy statutes: (1) the Federal Power Act, (2) the
Natural Gas Act, and (3) the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

190

Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015). He also relied on the National
Emergencies Act (NEA) (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51), § 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)), and § 301 of Title 3 of the U.S. Code. Id.
191
Exec. Order No. 13,846, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,939 (Aug. 6, 2018).
192
Exec. Order No. 13,850, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,243 (Nov. 1, 2018).
193
The “bulk-power system electric equipment” is defined broadly and includes any equipment used
in substations, control rooms, or power-generating stations. Exec. Order No. 13,920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,595
(May 1, 2020).
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
See infra Appendix A for a full list. A number of emergency energy provisions merely address
employment, licensing, inspections, or exchanges of supplies. This Section focuses on the three most
substantive emergency energy provisions.
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1. The Federal Power Act
The Federal Power Act (FPA) provides two specific grants of
emergency authority to the President and two such grants to an expert energy
agency. The first unilateral FPA emergency delegation to the President
appears in § 215A, a provision that Congress added in 2015 as part of the
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act.198 Section 215A
provides the President with the sole power to declare a “grid security
emergency.”199 The statute defines a grid-security emergency as “the
occurrence or imminent danger of” (1) a “malicious act using electronic
communication or an electromagnetic pulse” that disrupts the operation of
devices and networks “that are essential to the reliability of” the critical or
defense electric infrastructure;200 or (2) a “direct physical attack” on critical
or defense electric infrastructure that results in “significant adverse effects
on the reliability of critical . . . or defense critical electric infrastructure.”201
The President’s declaration of such a grid-security emergency is
required to unlock the Secretary’s authority to then issue orders for
emergency measures “to protect or restore the reliability” of critical or
defense electric infrastructure during such emergency.202 Congress defined
“the Secretary” as “the Secretary of Energy” 203 (also known as the Secretary
of the DOE) and has provided the Secretary with significant discretion to
address the emergency with measures “as are necessary in the judgment of
the Secretary.”204 Congress cabined the President’s declaration of a grid
emergency with nothing but the statutory definition and a post hoc
notification requirement to “congressional committees of relevant
jurisdiction.”205 However, it did provide for automatic expiration of gridsecurity emergency orders after fifteen days, although they are subject to
repeated renewals.206 Section 215A has never been invoked.

198
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 215A, 129 Stat. 1312, 1774
(2015) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(b)(1)).
199
Id. § 215A, 129 Stat. at 1773 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7)).
200
16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7)(A).
201
Id. § 824o-1(a)(7)(B).
202
Id. § 824o-1(b)(1); see also Exec. Order No. 13,744, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,573 (Oct. 13, 2016) (stating
that “[t]he Secretary of Energy shall facilitate the protection and restoration of the reliability of the
electrical power grid during a presidentially declared grid security emergency”).
203
16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(8).
204
Id. § 824o-1(b)(1).
205
Id. § 824o-1(b)(2). In contrast, Congress requires the DOE to “consult with appropriate
governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico,” entities affected by the orders, FERC, and “other
appropriate Federal agencies regarding implementation.” Id. § 824o-1(b)(3).
206
Id. § 824o-1(b)(5)(A)–(B).
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The second unilateral FPA emergency delegation to the President
appears in § 809. Under § 809, Congress also provides the President with
authority to “enter” and “take possession” of any licensed project to
manufacture war provisions “or for any other purpose involving the safety
of the United States” based solely on the “opinion of the President” that “the
safety of the United States demands” it.207 No independent presidential
emergency declaration is required,208 and a licensed project under FPA § 809
could include anything from the construction of a power house to the
renovation of a dam or power lines.209 To date, this provision has never been
used.210
The third FPA emergency provision, § 202(c), delegates authority not
to the President, but to “the Commission,” defined as the “Federal Power
Commission,” the predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).211 Interestingly, although the text of § 202(c) refers to
“the Commission,” Congress later delegated power to the Secretary of the
DOE rather than to FERC.212 In § 202(c), Congress provides the DOE with
the power to order temporary connections between facilities that generate,

207

Id. § 809 (“When in the opinion of the President of the United States, evidenced by a written
order addressed to the holder of any license under this chapter, the safety of the United States demands
it, the United States shall have the right to enter upon and take possession of any project or part thereof,
constructed, maintained, or operated under said license, for the purpose of manufacturing nitrates,
explosives, or munitions of war, or for any other purpose involving the safety of the United States, to
retain possession, management, and control thereof for such length of time as may appear to the President
to be necessary to accomplish said purposes, and then to restore possession and control to the party or
parties entitled thereto . . . .”). Congress does provide for just compensation to avoid Fifth Amendment
violations. Ga. Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, Etc., 563 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977), overruled in part
by Ga. Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980). Notably, because this provision does not
reference an “emergency,” it was not captured in Appendix B but was added to Appendix A as another
statutory energy emergency provision.
208
16 U.S.C. § 809.
209
See id. § 796(11) (defining the term “project” in the FPA).
210
FERC has indicated, however, that it would waive temporary federal use of a facility under § 809
for minor license renewals. Hydroelectric Relicensing Regulations Under the Federal Power Act, 54 Fed.
Reg. 23,756–61 (May 17, 1989).
211
Federal Power Act § 202(c), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
212
Under § 301(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOE Act), 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b),
the powers previously vested in the Federal Power Commission under the FPA (and other statutes) and
not expressly reserved to FERC were transferred to, and vested in, the Secretary of Energy. Although the
DOE Act reserved to FERC powers to require interconnection of electric facilities under § 202(b) of the
FPA, and DOE has since delegated certain other powers, including those provided by § 202(a) to FERC,
§ 202(c) authority remains with the Secretary of Energy. Id. § 7172(a)(1) (“There are transferred to, and
vested in, the Commission the following functions . . . the interconnection, under section 202(b), of [the
Federal Power Act], of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy (other than
emergency interconnection [which remains with the Secretary of Energy]) . . . .”).
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transmit, exchange, or deliver electricity.213 However, this power is
constrained only when the DOE determines that an emergency exists by
reason of five circumstances: (1) a sudden increase in the demand for electric
energy; (2) a shortage of electric energy; (3) a shortage of facilities for the
generation or transmission of electric energy; (4) a shortage of fuel or water
for generating facilities; or (5) other causes.214 This authority is only cabined
where there is a conflict with environmental laws.215 The DOE has only
issued seventeen orders under this provision since 1935, traditionally in
response to a utility request as opposed to a DOE-initiated order.216
The last FPA provision allows FERC to “enter into contracts with
public or private power systems for the mutual exchange of unused excess
power” to provide “emergency or break-down relief.”217 There is no evidence
that this narrow provision has ever been used by FERC.
2. The Natural Gas Act
The Natural Gas Act (NGA) provides the President with three unilateral
powers related to energy emergencies. Like the FPA’s “grid-security
emergency” provision, the NGA provides the President with unilateral

213
Federal Power Act § 202(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). The Commission can order five actions:
(1) temporary connections of facilities; (2) generation of electric energy; (3) delivery of electric energy;
(4) interchange of electricity; or (5) transmission of electricity.
214
Federal Power Act § 202(c), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1).
215
16 U.S.C. § 824a(c); see also Joel deJesus, New Grid Security Measures for 2016, PUB. UTILS.
FORT., Feb. 2016, at 43 (tailoring DOE’s emergency orders narrowly to the “hours necessary to meet the
emergency and serve the public interest” and noting that an entity’s compliance with such order “shall
not be considered a violation” of any federal, state, or local environmental law).
216
For example, the most frequently used provision is FPA § 202(c). DOE lists eight times that it
has issued orders since 2000. See infra note 265. Additional orders prior to 2000 include: Carolina
Aluminum Co., 2 F.P.C. 998, 998–99 (1941); Duke Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 992, 992 (1941) (detailing the
same emergency declaration in North Carolina as Carolina Aluminum Co. but issuing different orders in
response); Fla. Power & Light Co. 2 F.P.C. 991, 991 (1941) (interconnection in Florida); Puget Sound
Power & Light Co., 6 F.P.C. 320, 320 (1947) (interconnection in the Pacific Northwest); Tex. Elec. Serv.
Co., 9 F.P.C. 1373, 1373 (1950) (interconnection in Texas); Commonwealth Edison Co., 16 F.P.C. 1145,
1146 (1956) (regarding a previous emergency); Ga. Power Co., 35 F.P.C. 629, 631 (1966)
(interconnection in Georgia); Ky. Utils. Co., 70 P.U.R.3d 475 (1967) (interconnections in Kentucky);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 47 F.P.C. 1412, 1412–13 (1972) (detailing that the Federal Power
Commission issued a § 202(c) order requiring interconnection between utility and city); see also Long
Island Lighting Co., 33 N.R.C. 61 (1991) (acknowledging that, while unused, it could be an alternate
authority to justify an order to continue operation of a nuclear plant). DOE rejected finding an emergency
during the oil embargo because the agency was able to facilitate successful corporation without declaring
an emergency. New Eng. Power Pool Participants, 54 F.P.C. 1375, 1375 (1975).
217
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832d(b), amended by Department of Energy Organization Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 302(b), 91 Stat. 565, 578–79 (1977).
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authority to declare a “natural gas supply emergency.”218 But unlike the FPA,
which defines a grid security emergency, the term “natural gas supply
emergency” is not defined in the NGA. The statute does, however, provide
two conditions that the President must meet before making such an
emergency declaration: (1) that a severe natural gas supply shortage that
endangers the supply of high-priority uses exists or is imminent; and (2) that
other alternatives have been exhausted and the President finds that the
“exercise of authorities under this section is reasonably necessary . . . to the
maximum extent practicable, to assist in meeting natural gas requirements
for such high-priority uses.”219
The President’s declaration of such a natural gas supply emergency is
required to unlock significant statutory authority to (1) prohibit the burning
of natural gas by any electric powerplant,220 (2) authorize the purchase of
emergency supplies of natural gas,221 and (3) allocate supplies of natural gas
to different entities.222 Congress also provided that a declaration of a natural
gas supply emergency terminates when the President finds that the shortage
is no longer imminent or in existence, or when 120 days after the date of the
declaration have passed, whichever is earlier.223 Congress again allowed for
extensions of such emergencies. However, the President is only allowed to
renew the emergency every 120 days in seeming perpetuity so long as the
President finds that the two conditions required to initially declare the natural
gas supply emergency continue to be satisfied.224
3. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
In the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Congress provides
the President with the sole power to take a number of energy conservation
measures to respond to an actual or potential shortfall in domestic or
international petroleum supplies upon a finding by the President that a
“severe energy supply interruption” exists or to fulfill “obligations of the
United States under the international energy program.”225 A “severe energy
218

Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717z(a), amended by Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 607, 92 Stat. 3117, 3171.
219
Id.
220
Id. § 717z(c).
221
Id. § 3362(a).
222
Id. § 3363(a).
223
Id. § 717z(b)(1).
224
Id. § 717z(a); id. § 717z(b)(2).
225
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) § 3(8), 42 U.S.C. § 6202(8); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO A SEVERE ENERGY SUPPLY
INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 651–52
(1982), https://www.justice.gov/file/23221/download [https://perma.cc/C9QM-4R4U] (“The IEP,
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supply interruption” is defined as a national energy supply shortage that the
President determines
(A) is, or is likely to be, of significant scope and duration, and of an emergency
nature;
(B) may cause major adverse impact on national safety or the national economy;
and
(C) results, or is likely to result, from [] an interruption in the supply of imported
petroleum products . . . or [] sabotage . . . or an act of God.226

This finding unlocks the President’s sole authority to take several
measures, a number of which are related to the electric grid. For instance,
even though power plants rely on petroleum to power less than 1% of the
electric grid, coal provides 23%.227 A “severe energy supply interruption”
would allow the President to take the following steps:






to “allocate coal (and require the transportation thereof) for the
use of any electric powerplant or major fuel-burning
installation . . . to insure reliability of electric service or prevent
unemployment, or protect public health, safety, or welfare”;228
to “prohibit any electric powerplant or major fuel-burning
installation from using natural gas or petroleum, or both, as a
primary energy source for the duration of such interruption”;229
to “drawdown and sell petroleum products” in the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve”;230 and
to “stay the application of any provision of this chapter, or any
rule or order thereunder, applicable to any new or existing
electric powerplant, if the President finds, and publishes such
finding, that an emergency exists, due to national, regional, or
systemwide shortages of coal or other alternate fuels, or
disruption of transportation facilities, which emergency is likely

established in 1974 by the Agreement on an International Energy Program (Agreement), to which the
United States is a signatory, provides for coordinated action among the 21 members (Participating
Countries) in order to decrease their vulnerability to supply disruptions and dependence on imported
oil.”).
226
EPCA § 3(8), 42 U.S.C. § 6202(8); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 225, at 651–52.
227
See Electricity Explained, supra note 18.
228
42 U.S.C. § 8374(a).
229
Id. § 8374(b).
230
Id. § 6241(a), (d). This power can also be triggered by a need to meet the obligations of the United
States under the international energy program. Id. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is a program requiring
storage of up to one billion barrels of petroleum in facilities to “reduce the impact of disruptions in
supplies of petroleum products” and to “diminish the vulnerability of the United States to the effects of a
severe energy supply interruption.” Id. § 6231. President Trump ordered the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
to be filled to capacity during the latest COVID-19 pandemic. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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to affect reliability of service of any such electric
powerplant.”231
Although these emergency energy powers have been used sparingly to
date,232 relatively recent presidential actions have indicated an increased
willingness to call upon national security powers during questionable
national emergencies.233 Such actions heighten the urgency to reassess the
assumptions underlying such delegations of unilateral presidential control.
III. REASSESSING THE TRADEOFFS OF UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
CONTROL OVER ENERGY EMERGENCIES
After a review of these delegations of emergency energy authority
directly to the President, one might remark on the notable absence of agency
involvement in almost all electric grid emergencies, placing these
delegations squarely in the upper-left quadrant (Strong President/Weak
Agency) of our Executive Delegations Matrix.234 As discussed in Part I, the
four primary justifications for this unilateral control are generally assumed
to outweigh any negative impacts on checks and balances and judicial
review.
Given the somewhat unusual placement of emergency grid powers in
the unilateral presidential powers quadrant of the matrix developed in Part I,
this last Part tests the four justifications of expertise, accountability,
consistency, and expediency for this type of unilateral presidential control.
It concludes that Congress may be able to better realize these values by
incorporating expert agencies into these emergency decisions, as they did
with a number of provisions, moving toward the upper-right quadrant
(Strong President/Strong Agency) of the Executive Delegations Matrix.235
Although devoid of all the nuances discussed below, Figure 2 provides a
simplified snapshot of these power dynamics between the President and an
agency and the values that may be realized by the four different
combinations. This Part counters the common narrative justifying unilateral
presidential control, using energy grid emergencies to demonstrate the

231

42 U.S.C. § 8374(c).
See supra Section II.B.1; supra note 215.
233
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (President Trump’s
executive order that denied entry for immigrants stemmed in part from his statutory national security
powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
234
See infra Appendix A (Strong President/Weak Agency).
235
See infra Appendix B (Strong President/Strong Agency).
232
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important role of an agency delegate,236 even if the President is the ultimate
decision-maker.
FIGURE 2: VALUE TRADEOFFS FOR EXECUTIVE DELEGATIONS MATRIX

AGENCY CONTROL
Weak
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Presidential
Accountability

- Effective
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Including agencies in emergency energy delegations is not entirely new.
A number of emergency statutes provide mixed delegations requiring agency
involvement prior to the President exercising such authority. As an example,
Congress addresses national security issues under the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 (TEA) using a shared delegation.237 Section 232(b) of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1862(b) leaves the trigger to unlock emergency powers with the Secretary
of Commerce. The Secretary must first investigate and find that a commodity
is entering the country “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security.”238 Only then shall the President take
236
Even Justice Stephen Breyer has stressed the benefits of depoliticized decision-making by the
elite professional experts found in agencies. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 55–56, 59–61 (1993).
237
19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991. This provision is reflected in Appendix A.
238
Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
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such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary “to adjust the imports
of the article and its derivatives so that such imports [of the article] will not
threaten to impair the national security.”239 As with the TEA, Congress
provides a number of factors for the agency to consider in making its
determination that the imports “threaten to impair the national security.”240
Similarly, this Part explores the potential benefits of incorporating a
larger role for an expert agency in conjunction with the President, to enhance
emergency energy decision-making. First, delegating to an agency has the
implicit advantage of imposing a consultation requirement on the President.
The President would of course be free to ignore the unique expertise of her
energy agencies, but it would slow down any uninformed knee-jerk reactions
allowable under direct presidential delegations. It also explores the special
case of independent energy agencies and their enhanced resistance to
political pressure from the presidency. Second, delegating to an agency
triggers the application of the APA, with its rulemaking requirements and
corresponding judicial review, therefore enhancing accountability. Third,
where a President must wield power through an agency, the President will
likely consider the bureaucratic burdens and the depletion of political capital
that is needed to massage an agency into doing her bidding.241 Because
agencies may disagree with the President, there is at least an opportunity for
agencies to influence the President’s decision-making. Furthermore, the role
of the agency can be tailored to the type of energy emergency to minimize
239

Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 1862(c) (listing the five factors).
241
See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2298 (“[A] President may face considerable constraints in imposing
his will on administrative actors. Their resistance to or mere criticism of a directive may inflict political
costs on the President as heavy as any that would result from an exercise of the removal power.”);
Percival, supra note 39, at 2533 (“Even if the President’s removal authority enables him to fire the heads
of executive agencies at will, requiring him to fire a resistant officer and replace him with an officer who
will take the action he desires invariably has substantial political costs.”); Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic
Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 163–65 (2018) (discussing ways in
which bureaucrats resist presidential policy goals); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 151213 (1992) (discussing administrative agencies’
ability to effectively make law through political decision-making). However, some scholars believe
instead that presidential control of agencies is the norm. See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2246 (“We live
today in an era of presidential administration.”); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American
Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1833–35 (2012) (describing
different presidential control theories and how presidential control has emerged since the 1980s with the
Reagan Administration). Additionally, the bureaucratic burden and depletion of political capital may
depend on the agency the President is attempting to assert control over. See Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony
Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis & David C. Nixon, Separated Powers in the United States:
The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 34850 (2012) (conducting
a study on agency ideology and finding that some agencies like the EPA and NLRB are much more liberal
than others like the DOD and DHS).
240
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the negative impacts on responsiveness. Particularly, the President would
still be able to act unilaterally in the case of acute emergencies but would be
subject to more procedural protections when addressing chronic
emergencies.242 With these potential positive effects in mind, this Part tests
the four justifications (expertise, accountability, consistency, and
expediency) against energy emergencies.
A. Expertise: Expert Energy Agencies
Although the motivations behind Congress’s choice to delegate to
agencies or to the President directly are often unclear,243 as I have
demonstrated previously, national security drives many direct presidential
delegations.244 The legislative history of these emergency energy delegations
is sparse, but a few comments equating an energy emergency to a national
security emergency suggest that national security was the driving force of
these decisions as well.245 In the House report discussing the DPA, for
instance, Congress made the link between energy supplies and national
security explicit: “The ‘Declaration of Policy’ is amended to make it clear
that it is necessary and appropriate, indeed essential, ‘to assure domestic
energy supplies for national defense needs.’”246 The legislative history of
§ 232(b) of the TEA similarly establishes that increasing the domestic
production of oil is a legitimate national security aim. 247 Other factors
suggest, however, that it is not national security expertise that is most needed
in energy emergencies. Instead, this Section demonstrates how the nature of
energy emergencies is changing. The prior focus on oil is shifting to a focus
on the electric grid, triggering corresponding demands for more technical
242

Stein, supra note 3, at 1252–56.
Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 289–90; see Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative
Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2006) (discussing possible factors that might be considered by
legislators when choosing delegation between agencies and courts).
244
See Stein, supra note 3, at 1194 (documenting the President’s unilateral power “to reject
sanctions, to waive sanctions for ‘a significant foreign narcotics trafficker,’ to waive the prohibition
against involuntary extension of enlistments of military personnel, to waive attachment of foreign
property to satisfy judgments, and to deny a request to inspect facilities in the United States” (footnotes
omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. §1903(g)(1))).
245
One energy exception where Congress reserved its power to trigger the emergency powers is the
Atomic Energy Act, which only authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission—now the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission—to suspend nuclear licenses, order recapture of nuclear materials, or order the
operation of a nuclear facility when “Congress declares that a state of war or national emergency exists,”
if the Commission finds that “in its judgment such action is necessary to the common defense and
security.” Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2138 (emphasis added).
246
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1104, at 187 (1980).
247
See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 10,542–43 (June 9, 1958) (statement of Rep. Mills).
243
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expertise, including that of independent energy agencies, to address energy
emergencies of the future.
1. Growing Value of Technical Expertise
Although some may argue that the President is an expert in areas of
national security,248 the evolving nature of energy emergencies is weakening
traditional arguments for unilateral presidential control. The historic fear of
a shortage of critical fossil fuels, which has national security implications, is
shifting to a fear of electric grid disruptions and widespread blackouts, which
are much more insular and domestic, negating the need for a solo
Commander in Chief.
Most twentieth-century scholars and policymakers contemplated that
an energy emergency would occur due to a shortage of key fossil fuels such
as oil and natural gas,249 two primary energy sources that then constituted the
majority of U.S. energy consumption, but that were not produced in
sufficient amounts domestically.250 The reliance on these imports from
foreign nations fueled much of the fear over energy emergencies.251 Further,
many of these emergency powers were forged during wartime,252 with their
uses likely anticipated for similar types of emergencies.
248
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018); see also Shirin Sinnar, Procedural
Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 999 (2018) (discussing
the traditional deference to the President on national security issues on the basis of speed, flexibility, and
access to knowledge). Professor Shirin Sinnar ultimately argues for less deference to the President but
has a thorough discussion of the reasoning behind deference to the executive in national security matters.
See id.
249
See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy Framework
for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 235, 270–74 (1989);
Earle H. O’Donnell & Laurel W. Glassman, Energy Emergencies: Constitutional Constraints on State
Efforts to Control Oil Supplies and Prices, 5 ENERGY L.J. 77, 77 (1984); James M. Summers, The Case
for Decontrolling the Price and Allocation of Crude Oil, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1975); DEP’T OF
JUST., LEGAL AUTHORITIES AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO A SEVERE ENERGY SUPPLY
INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (1982).
250
Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy 1850–2017, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/oil-dependence-and-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/39D3-7LJG].
251
See, e.g., Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The
Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 LAW & BUS.
REV. AMS. 381, 382–83, 404 (2007); Tracey A. LeBeau, Energy Security and Increasing North American
Oil and Gas Production, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 193, 193 (2002); Matthew E. Chen & Amy Meyers Jaffe,
Energy Security: Meeting the Growing Challenge of National Oil Companies, 8 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. &
INT’L RELS. 9, 18–20 (2007); Surya Gablin Gunasekara, A Sticky Situation: Oil Sands, Alternative Fuels,
Energy Security, and the EISA Section 526 Petroleum-Procurement Problem, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY
& ENV’T L. 248, 248–50 (2012).
252
See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717z (passed first in 1978, three years after the Vietnam War);
IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (passed first in 1977, two years after the end of the Vietnam War); EPCA,
42 U.S.C. § 6202 (passed first in 1975, the same year the Vietnam War ended); Federal Power Act,
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However, twenty-first-century scholars have different energyemergency concerns. Although the United States still relies on oil, coal, and
natural gas for approximately 80% of domestic energy consumption,253 our
fears of a shortage have been tempered by increasing domestic production of
both resources.254 For the first time in decades, the United States has become
a net exporter of oil, alleviating peak oil concerns.255 And developers in the
early 2000s applied hydraulic fracturing technology to previously
economically unrecoverable natural gas shale formations to usher in a natural
gas supply boom.256
With fossil fuel supplies now in abundance domestically, energy
emergencies of today will instead generally focus on the reliability of the
electric grid.257 Grid-reliability emergencies can be caused by many sources,
including operator error;258 inadequate planning; cybersecurity attacks;259
natural disasters;260 physical disruptions to the generation, transmission, or
distribution facilities; physical attacks on energy infrastructure261 market
structure,262 or even an overgrown tree.263 The increasing automation of the
grid heightens these concerns, creating millions of hackable points. These
16 U.S.C. § 824o-1 (passed first in 1920, in the midst of World War I); Earle H. O’Donnell & Laurel W.
Glassman, After the EPAA: What Oil Allocation and Pricing Authorities Remain?, 2 ENERGY L. J. 33, 41
(1981) (“The DPA was enacted on September 8, 1950, in the context of, and in response to, the Korean
War.”).
253
Energy Facts: Consumption and Production, supra note 14.
254
Id. (finding that the U.S. domestic production is now greater than energy consumption).
255
See id.; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
256
ZHONGMIN WANG & ALAN KRUPNICK, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, US SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT:
WHAT LED TO THE BOOM? (2013).
257
One notable exception was the energy emergency of April 2020 when the COVID-19 shutdown
resulted in a surplus of oil with no place for storage. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
258
See OFF. OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 21, at 1–10.
259
See sources cited supra note 22.
260
See sources cited supra note 21.
261
See Rebecca Smith, Assault on California Power Station Raises Alarm on Potential for
Terrorism, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/assault-on-california-powerstation-raises-alarm-on-potential-for-terrorism-1391570879 [https://perma.cc/2QJN-X85W]; M CLARTY
& RIDGE, supra note 22, at 25–36; Avi Schnurr, Vulnerability of National Power Grids to
Electromagnetic Threats: Domestic and International Perspectives, 34 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6, 18 (2013); U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR APRIL 2020 (2020),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_b_1 [https://perma.cc/J2XQL9D4].
262
Robert Walton, ERCOT Calls 2 Energy Emergencies in One Week, 3rd in 5 Years, UTIL. DIVE
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ercot-calls-2nd-energy-emergency-this-week-3rd-in5-years/561065/ [https://perma.cc/24YN-5NE9].
263
JR Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout–Five Years Later, SCI. AM. (Aug. 13, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/
[https://perma.cc/E2S4KQXA].
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concerns are further exacerbated by an ever-increasing reliance on
technology across our society, with every cell phone, computer, military
installation, and refrigeration-and-cooling system dependent on electricity.
While rolling blackouts are disruptive, an extended loss of electricity could
be catastrophic.264 If history is any example, the instances where emergencyenergy authority has been used more frequently have surrounded technical
issues about the amount of generation or transmission capacity available on
the grid.265
Recent events reflect the changing nature of an energy emergency. For
instance, an energy emergency in Montana erupted when additional energy
resources were needed to address wildfires.266 On the flip side, wildfires
created an energy emergency in California, where rolling blackouts were
instituted to address threatened damage to the electric grid.267 And an energy
264

Alyssa Flores, California Begins Rolling Blackouts for the First Time in 19 Years, Stage 3
Emergency Declared, ABC30 (Aug. 15, 2020), https://abc30.com/electricity-power-flex-alertdemand/6371510/ [https://perma.cc/VDV4-9NWL]; DEP’T OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC SPECTRUM PLAN 21
(2007) (“DOE published a total cost estimate of about $6 billion dollars as attributable to the 2003 power
outage.”); OFF. OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at
6 (noting that for a power company in New Orleans, blackouts result in a cost of “$260 to $325 million
and a loss of customer revenue estimated at $147 million”); James Wagner & Frances Robles, Puerto
Rico Is Once Again Hit by an Islandwide Blackout, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/puerto-rico-power-outage.html
[https://perma.cc/HHB6NVC3] (discussing the costs of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico—close to $2.5 billion).
265
DOE’s use of § 202(c) since 2000 includes: 12/14/00 emergency order to address California
energy crisis; 8/16/02 order requiring the Cross-Sound Cable to continue operating; 8/14/03 order
requiring the Cross-Sound Cable to continue operating in response to a blackout; 8/24/05 order requiring
the operation of the Potomac River generating station; 9/28/05 order authorizing CenterPoint Energy to
temporarily connect electricity lines to restore power to Entergy Gulf States in response to Hurricane
Katrina; 9/14/08 order authorizing CenterPoint Energy to temporarily connect electricity lines to restore
power to Entergy Gulf States in response to Hurricane Ike; 4/14/07 order authorizing a state-owned utility
in Oklahoma to operate its generating unit as needed to provide dynamic reactive power support; 6/16/07
order authorizing PJM Interconnection to direct operation of generation units under strictly limited
conditions for reliability purposes. DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority Archived, OFF.
OF
ELEC.,
https://www.energy.gov/oe/does-use-federal-power-act-emergency-authority-archived
[https://perma.cc/7X5Q-6H47] (prior to 2015); DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority
Archived, OFF. OF ELEC., https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-andimplementation/other-regulatory-efforts/does-use [https://perma.cc/V5E9-UCWK] (after 2015); see also
Jeff St. John, Legal Considerations for DOE’s Leaked Coal and Nuclear Bailout Plan, GREEN TECH
MEDIA (June 6, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/legal-doe-leaked-coal-andnuclear-bailout-plan#gs.ovo3wb [https://perma.cc/XSV6-QVXY].
266
MTN News, Governor Declares State of Energy Emergency as Wildfires Flare, MISSOULA
CURRENT (July 28, 2019), https://missoulacurrent.com/outdoors/2019/07/montana-wildfires-emergency/
[https://perma.cc/AL9N-PL94].
267
The California Public Utilities Commission approved public-safety power-shutoff rules for the
big
three
utilities.
De-Energization
(PSPS),
CAL.
PUB.
UTILS.
COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/ [https://perma.cc/SS93-VLUC] (“The State’s investor-owned
electric utilities, notably Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison, and
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emergency was caused by the first malicious “cyber event” that disrupted
grid operations in the western United States.268 Additionally, prior
presidential administrations have used statutory emergency energy powers
to successfully address hurricanes,269 pandemics,270 and terrorist attacks.
Arguments that the President is more qualified to address energy
emergencies are also weakened when one sees how Congress has made its
delegate decisions with respect to environmental emergencies. Congress has
delegated almost all environmental emergency powers to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), an agency with well-recognized and specific
expertise in environmental matters, with its emergency powers as follows:271
 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)’s “Emergency Powers”:
“[T]he Administrator . . . may take such actions as he may deem
necessary in order to protect the health” of persons upon receipt
of information about a drinking water contaminant that may
present an “imminent and substantial endangerment.”272
 Clean Water Act (CWA)’s “Emergency Powers”: “[T]he
Administrator” may take any actions necessary to address water
pollution presenting “an imminent and substantial
endangerment” to public health or welfare.273
 Clean Air Act (CAA)’s “Emergency Powers”: The EPA may take
actions necessary to abate air pollution presenting an “imminent
and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare.”274
San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), may shut off electric power . . . to protect public safety under
California law . . . .”).
268
Sobczak, supra note 22.
269
See Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005) (declaring national emergency
for Hurricane Katrina and suspending labor laws); see also BRENNAN REPORT, supra note 29, at 1 (noting
that emergency declarations under the Disaster Relief Act have been issued on average nine times
annually between 1974 and 2014).
270
Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69; Proclamation No. 8443,
3 C.F.R. 148 (Oct. 23, 2009).
271
See, e.g., Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2016)
(observing court’s obligation to “defer to EPA agency expertise”); Ohio Valley Env’t Coal. v. Horinko,
279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 756 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (“[T]he court will defer to the EPA’s reasonable
interpretations . . . in light of the EPA’s particular knowledge and expertise in this area.”); Texas v. U.S.
Env’t Prot. Agency, 690 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Our review is most deferential to the EPA’s fact
findings, particularly where those findings relate to the EPA’s evaluation of scientific data for which the
Agency possesses technical expertise.”); U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 830 F.3d 579, 636 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (“Our conclusion is driven, in large part, by the deference we owe the EPA when it determines
how best to meet the technical challenges in its area of expertise.”).
272
Safe Drinking Water Act: Emergency Powers § 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a).
273
Clean Water Act §§ 311, 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364.
274
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7603.
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Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA)’s “Imminent Hazard”
Powers: The EPA may take actions necessary to address the
“disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste [that] may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment.”275
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)’s “Emergency Powers”:
The EPA has the right of first refusal to take actions necessary to
address asbestos in schools that pose “an imminent and
substantial endangerment” to human health or the environment.276

Congress similarly delegated powers to address any public health and
safety emergencies related to mining operations to the Department of the
Interior. 277 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),
unlike the FPA, NGA, and EPCA, provides the agency with the sole power
to determine whether a coal-mining “emergency exists constituting a danger
to the public health, safety, or general welfare” and “no other person or
agency will act expeditiously to restore, reclaim, abate, control, or prevent
the adverse effects of coal mining practices.”278 Even though coal is used to
power the electric grid, these emergency powers relate to the environmental
and public health and safety hazards that can result from mining operations
that extract coal from the land, as opposed to supply issues of coal.279
Administered by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSMRE), and often delegated to the states to enforce (with
oversight from OSMRE), the SMCRA delegates to the OSMRE expansive
authority to enter and take actions to “restore, reclaim, abate, control, or
prevent the adverse effects of coal mining” and protect public health and
safety to respond to an emergency.280 This expansive authority resulted in
three related emergency authorities for the Secretary of Interior: to (1)

275

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6973.
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2648.
277
For a comprehensive assessment of the many avenues that the Department of Interior can use to
address national emergencies, see generally William G. Myers III & Karen E. Mouritsen, The Department
of the Interior’s Role in National Emergencies, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 177 (2002).
278
30 U.S.C. § 1240(a).
279
See, e.g., Pendleton v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 480, 481 (2000). The Office of Surface Mining
(OSM) conducted its own investigation, determined that a landslide had occurred, that the potential
existed for further damage, and that the emergency warranted remediation. Id.
280
30 U.S.C. § 1240(b).
276
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acquire land in response to a coal emergency,281 (2) spend funds to respond
to a coal emergency,282 and (3) suspend coal-mining exploration activities.283
Congress similarly delegates substantial environmental emergency
authorities to other agencies with expertise in their respective areas.284 In fact,
the only environmental statute identified that delegates directly to the
President to address an environmental emergency is the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
where the President is authorized to act for the removal of imminent
hazardous-substance releases285 and seek remedial relief to address those
releases.286 In those situations, the President is cabined by the national
contingency plan developed by the EPA287 in making such authorizations.288
Interestingly, even national security concerns did not motivate a change
in delegation. Congress delegated the power to address contaminated
drinking water under the SDWA to the agency, even where the source of the
contaminant is “a threatened or potential terrorist attack (or other intentional
act designed to disrupt the provision of safe drinking water or to impact
adversely the safety of drinking water supplied to communities and
281

Id. § 1237.
Id. § 1240(a).
283
Id. § 1411(b)(2).
284
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 20104 (delegating emergency authority to the Secretary of Transportation
to decide whether an unsafe condition or practice causes an emergency situation involving a hazard of
death, personal injury, or significant harm to the environment and to immediately order restrictions and
prohibitions as necessary); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e)
(delegating emergency authority to the “Secretary” or relevant congressional committee to withdraw land
after determining that an emergency exists and that “extraordinary measures must be taken to preserve
values that would otherwise be lost”); Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)
(authorizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate additional “mandatory health or safety standards for the
protection of life and prevention of injuries in coal or other mines”). Another example is the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, where Congress perceived the industrial-safety problem to be so severe that it
provided for an abbreviated procedure for summary promulgation of safety standards.
285
CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(9)(A) (allowing the
President to act after an agency designation of “imminent and substantial endangerment”).
286
CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
287
CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (providing that “the President shall, after notice and
opportunity for public comments, revise and republish the national contingency plan for the removal of
oil and hazardous substances”). However, the President has delegated primary authority under this section
to the EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9615).
288
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1); A&W Smelters and Refiners, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 302, at *5 (EAB 1996) (“On
January 14, the three truckloads from Mexico were returned to the United States. Because A&W did not
assume responsibility for these truckloads, and the four being released by the United States, the Region
considered them abandoned, and exercised its emergency response authority under CERCLA to arrange
for these truckloads to be transported to a nearby RCRA-approved hazardous waste treatment . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
282
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individuals).”289 Similarly, Congress delegated power to the Secretary of
Defense to determine if there is an imminent threat to a chemical facility
from a terrorist threat.290 These delegations suggest that in certain
circumstances, subject-matter expertise may trump even national security
expertise.
To confirm our suspicions about the uniquely unilateral delegations in
the energy sector, we explored all of the emergency provisions in the U.S.
Code.291 Our findings confirm both the general exclusion of expert agencies
in emergencies related to the electric grid, as well as the general inclusion of
expert agencies in other similarly technical sectors. For instance, similar to
energy emergencies, food-and-drug and pandemic emergencies are often
national in scope292 and arguably require the same level of expediency
required to address an energy emergency. Nevertheless, in all eight of the
emergency provisions related to food and drugs, Congress instead decided
to vest the power to declare an emergency not to the President, but to the
expert agency, the Food and Drug Administration.293 Even within the twenty
energy emergency provisions that provide unilateral authority to an agency,
only two address the electric grid. The remaining eighteen provisions address
personnel, funding, public health and safety, environmental protection, and
agreements to store oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.294 In fact, except
in the area of foreign relations and armed forces, our research failed to turn
up any other area of law with as much unilateral presidential power in
emergencies as energy.295
There may be an argument that energy emergencies have the potential
to have more national impact than environmental emergencies, thus
justifying presidential expertise. Even though an energy emergency may be
confined to a local area, the interconnected nature of the grid means there is
a higher risk of cascading effects, leading to potentially national impact.296
289

Safe Drinking Water Act § 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a).
6 U.S.C. § 624.
291
See supra notes 106108.
292
See Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69; Food Safety During
Emergencies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/recalls-outbreaksemergencies/food-safety-during-emergencies [https://perma.cc/TFK7-8GHV].
293
21 U.S.C. § 2225; id. § 360bbb; id. § 360bbb-3; id. § 360eee-1; id. § 371; id. § 379; id. § 379e;
id. § 829.
294
See infra Appendix A (Weak President/Strong Agency).
295
Our research resulted in one emergency statute in telecommunications, one in labor, and two in
agriculture. For comparison, there were fourteen statutes in foreign relations and intercourse. See infra
Appendix A.
296
See MISSION SUPPORT CTR., IDAHO NAT’L LAB’Y, supra note 22, at 10 (noting that “bulk power
in the U.S. is still currently delivered throughout an interconnected, interdependent, and in many areas
290
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Whereas local environmental pollution, such as that caused by coal, is also
interconnected, its cascade effect may be more gradual.297 A second reason
may be because environmental emergencies are perceived as requiring more
expertise than energy emergencies.298 Perhaps there is something about the
science of hydrology and contaminant paths that appears less accessible than
the science of electrons. Regardless of the reason, although some energy
emergencies may involve foreign interference justifying presidential action,
many of them require a technical expertise that the President lacks.299 Thus,
despite these critiques, as the nature of energy emergencies continues to
evolve from wartime anxiety over our inability to fuel our own transportation
and electricity needs to peacetime concerns about widespread grid blackouts,
the need for a national security expert diminishes and the need for a technical
grid expert increases.
2. The Special Case of Independent Agencies
A second factor that cuts in favor of involving agencies is the fact that
one of our expert agencies, FERC, is an independent agency whose
involvement could increase the President’s legitimacy in her decisionmaking and the transparency of such decisions. This is worth discussing,
because in addition to bureaucratic concerns, many critics too quickly
dismiss the possibility that agencies can have any meaningful impact on a
president’s decision-making.300 For those supporters of a unitary executive,
including an executive agency would have minimal effect. The President will
implement her will, whether it be through her own hand or through her
agency pawn. This supports the need for involving an independent agency.
Although there are a number of expert energy agencies, including the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), the Department of Interior (DOI), and the newest addition, the

aging grid” in assessing vulnerabilities from cyber and physical electric grid attacks); see also J.B. Ruhl,
Governing Cascade Failures in Complex Social-Ecological-Technological Systems: Framing Context,
Strategies, and Challenges, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 407 (2019).
297
See Debbie Elliott, 5 Years After BP Oil Spill, Effects Linger and Recovery Is Slow, NPR (Apr.
10, 2015, 3:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400374744/5-years-after-bp-oil-spill-effectslinger-and-recovery-is-slow [https://perma.cc/RH4N-ARWB].
298
Tracey L. Cloutier, Joined at the Hip: The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Principle of
Deference—The Struggle for Power Has the EPA Caught in the Middle, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 63,
87 (2000).
299
Kovacs, supra note 55, at 565 (noting that “the President lacks the expertise of agencies”).
300
See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 76, at 1428–36 (describing how presidents have actually impeded
agency decision-making by imposing various review requirements and filtering communication with the
President through the Office of Management and Budget).
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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),301 the DOE
appears to be chosen for purposes of energy emergencies rather than FERC.
The DOE has been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for
energy, indicating a specialized expertise in the field.302 And as discussed
above, one of the only emergency energy powers Congress delegated to an
agency under FPA § 202(c) eventually ended up with the DOE. The DOE
may have become the expert agency of choice again because of its status as
an executive agency as opposed to an independent agency.303 As discussed
below, historically FERC, unlike the DOE, has not hesitated to oppose
actions and deny rules it deems to be imprudent, even if the actions and rules
directly further presidential policy objectives.304 Scholars have documented
the limited ability of executive agencies to withstand presidential directives
as well as the strong removal powers retained by presidents to deal with
recalcitrant executive agencies, as opposed to independent agencies.305
Although there is limited delegation to the DOE, as discussed above,
even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that Congress has rarely delegated
any emergency energy authority to FERC. FERC is an independent expert
energy agency tasked with regulating the bulk of the federal portion of the
electric grid, with a mission to “[a]ssist consumers in obtaining economically

301
Congress created a new agency within the Department of Homeland Security to address
cybersecurity emergencies, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), although its
role appears to be mainly information-gathering, risk assessment, and coordination, rather than having
any actual authority to respond to energy emergencies. See CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC.
AGENCY, https://www.dhs.gov/CISA (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). The main responsibilities of CISA
include: accessing, receiving, and analyzing information on cybersecurity threats; assessing key resource
and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; and developing a comprehensive plan to secure key resources
and critical infrastructure. 6 U.S.C. § 652.
302
Federal Authorities, OFF. OF CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SEC., & EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
https://www.energy.gov/ceser/activities/energy-security/emergency-preparedness/federal-authorities
[https://perma.cc/57SZ-HPEV].
303
Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378, 381 (2019) (“One
important way in which Congress has designed agencies to resist presidential encroachment is by vesting
all administrative authority on a given matter in an independent, bipartisan commission.”).
304
See infra Section III.C for a discussion of the DOE and FERC’s responses to President Trump’s
coal-industry bailout plan.
305
See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation
of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (2000) (“The critical element of
independence is the protection—conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied—against removal
except ‘for cause.’”); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 769 (2013) (arguing there is “a broad set of indicia
of independence: removal protection, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, budget and
congressional communication authority, litigation authority, and adjudication authority”).
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efficient, safe, reliable, and secure energy services at a reasonable cost.”306
FERC is composed of up to five commissioners appointed by the President,
each serving five-year terms with equal vote on regulatory matters.307 FERC
also maintains oversight of the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the “international regulatory authority whose mission
is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and
security of the grid,” and which is responsible for approving and enforcing
reliability standards.308 While the NERC’s area of responsibility spans
outside the United States, it has been certified as the nation’s Electric
Reliability Organization by FERC.309 “No other federal government entity
[besides FERC] has authority relevant to the day-to-day provision of reliable
electric service.”310 Despite its energy expertise, the only provision where
FERC retains emergency energy power relates to hydropower.311 Beyond
FPA § 202(c)’s initial delegation to FERC, Congress did not contemplate the
inclusion of FERC in assessing energy emergencies.312 One theory for this
choice of delegation is the more limited control that the President has over

306
About FERC, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/what-ferc/overview
[https://perma.cc/CP4X-TFKV].
307
Meet
the
Commissioners,
FED.
ENERGY
REGUL.
COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/about/commission-members [https://perma.cc/748J-TJSW].
308
About
NERC,
N.
AM.
ELEC.
RELIABILITY
CORP.,
https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7C2A-CPVY].
309
Electric Reliability, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/electric/electric-reliability [https://perma.cc/5YC3-Y6DL]. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 2005 gave FERC authority to select a national Electric Reliability Organization. Order Certifying North
American Reliability Corporation as the Electric Reliability Organization and Ordering Compliance
Filing, 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2006). The Electric Reliability Organization is tasked with developing and
enforcing standards to ensure the reliability of our nation’s grid. Id.
310
JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 4.
311
16 U.S.C. § 803(b) (“[E]xcept when emergency shall require for the protection of navigation, life,
health, or property, no substantial alteration or addition not in conformity with the approved plans shall
be made to any dam or other project works constructed hereunder of an installed capacity in excess of
two thousand horsepower without the prior approval of the Commission; and any emergency alteration
or addition so made shall thereafter be subject to such modification and change as the Commission may
direct.”). As described in Section II.B.1, even though Congress originally provided FERC with § 202(c)
emergency authority, Congress later reorganized the provision to delegate this power to the DOE. This
provision does not appear in our Appendix because the passive voice makes it unclear whether the
President or the agency has this emergency power. See supra note 107.
312
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1379(4) (requiring the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to consult
with the Secretary of Treasury and report to Congress every two years describing the “implications of the
technology standard” to confirm identity); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring every federal agency to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior before taking any action to insure that their actions are “not
likely to jeopardize . . . endangered species or threatened species”); 49 U.S.C. § 32902(i) (requiring the
Secretary of Transportation to consult with the Secretary of Energy in prescribing regulations for average
fuel-economy standards).
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independent agencies. Scholars have analyzed various aspects of
independent agencies,313 including FERC,314 suggesting that the President
would need to exert even more political capital into getting an independent
agency to do his bidding. As such, the President may have an easier time
controlling the DOE than FERC. Due to the limited legislative history
explaining Congress’s choice, it is unclear whether the delegations to the
DOE are a tacit acquiescence to the President or whether such delegations
are just a byproduct of historical delegations.315 To include FERC in the
energy emergency decision-making process, therefore, may enhance the
legitimacy of the President’s energy emergency actions, without
jeopardizing her ability to swiftly respond to emergencies.316
313

See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 215 (introducing a symposium titled “The Independence of
Independent Agencies”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 305, at 780–81 (assessing the President’s power
over independent agencies); Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as
Symbol, 47 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1997) (describing independent agencies as “somewhat
less susceptible to direct presidential control than are executive branch agencies”); Strauss & Sunstein,
supra note 57, at 203 (describing independent agencies as “somewhat remote from presidential
direction”); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 609 (1989) (noting that “[d]espite the theoretical interest inherent
in the constitutional issues, no one has comprehensively assessed the impact on [independent] agency
policymaking of whatever insulation from direct presidential supervision such agencies enjoy”); Peter L.
Strauss, supra note 37, at 589 (describing the President’s influence as reaching “somewhat more deeply
into the top layers of bureaucracy at an executive agency than at an independent commission”); Aziz Z.
Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27–32 (2013) (describing the vast array of
devices for presidential control of independent agencies).
314
Jacobs, supra note 303, at 382; Jason Pinney, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
Environmental Justice: Do the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better
Way?, 30 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 353, 398 (2003) (discussing FERC’s independence generally and
how it has held on to its autonomy).
315
In 2006, when Congress transferred FERC’s FPA powers to the DOE, the sudden change in
delegation may have reflected the desire of a Republican-controlled Congress to appease the Bush
Administration. The Bush Administration was known for exercising tight control over agency policy
decisions. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort
and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 601 (2010) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)). Vice President Dick
Cheney would often call agencies and persuade them to make a decision that reflected the
Administration’s policy preferences. Id. Lemos, supra note 30, at 415 (“On its face, that finding might
seem to call into question the general assumption that agencies are more susceptible to presidential
influence than are courts. It bears emphasis, however, that the EEOC is an independent agency.
Independent agencies tend to be governed by a bipartisan commission over which the President has only
limited removal authority—and, hence, limited means of control.”).
316
Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting Our
Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 341–43 (2013) (arguing that
FERC should have emergency powers over cybersecurity); David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and
Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2012) (“Cybersecurity has been described as ‘a major

857

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

B. Accountability: Short-Term vs. Long-Term
A second justification for unilateral presidential control is
accountability. But accountability is a loaded term. For instance, Justice
Kagan, in her discussion of the unitary executive, appeared to focus on the
electoral process as a check on the President.317 However, there is a large
body of scholarship that disagrees with Justice Kagan’s assertion that
presidential authority is more politically accountable than its appointedagency counterparts.318 Specifically, critics of this view assert that, in reality,
the President will not necessarily reflect majoritarian preferences on policy
issues any more than agency heads.319
Further, the justification of accountability is undermined when the
temporal nature of holding a president accountable is considered. If the
public has to wait for a four-year term to end to hold the President
accountable, so much time could pass between a disputed presidential action
and the electoral means to hold that president accountable that it could render
the cause-and-effect component meaningless. The President is unlikely to be
national security problem for the United States.’” (quoting CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 1 (2008))). Notably, this theory may not always play
out in practice when the majority of the independent FERC commissioners have been appointed by the
sitting president. President Trump has appointed all four of the current FERC commissioners. Meet the
Commissioners, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/commission-members
[https://perma.cc/443M-5QEN]. Recent FERC decisions consistently fall in line with the Trump
Administration’s policy decisions. See, e.g., Order Issuing Certificate and Approving Abandonment,
170 FERC ¶ 61,045 (2020); Scott DiSavino, U.S. FERC Sides with PennEast Natgas Pipeline New Jersey
Eminent Domain Case, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2020, 2:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usapenneast-new-jersey/u-s-ferc-sides-with-penneast-natgas-pipeline-new-jersey-eminent-domain-caseidUSKBN1ZT2VH [https://perma.cc/VLM2-DC52]; see also JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 24–25
(discussing how a previous DOE employee that worked closely on the DOE’s coal bailout plan was
nominated and confirmed as a new FERC commissioner and how his “appointment provides DOE with
an ally in any such proceeding and raises the possibility that FERC itself might raise rates for baseload
plants through its regulation of RTO market rules”).
317
Kagan, supra note 33, at 2331–33.
318
See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 54, at 53, 63 (observing that “the critics of strong presidentialism
may outnumber the proponents” and that “a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political
control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic
policymaking”).
319
PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 146, 161 (2009); Kovacs, supra note 55, at 564 (“The fact that the President need not win a
majority of the vote to be elected (or reelected) further undermines his potential democratic
accountability.”); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 558 (2018) (noting that
“[a]ccording to Shane, presidential administration becomes a means to use information control to thwart
accountability when politically advantageous”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 49394 (2003)
(questioning the normative value of majoritarianism).
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able to connect the causal chain between the prior act and the political
consequences after an extended period of time, and any ties to the electoral
result will be confounded by a number of other variables. In this sense,
unilateral delegations to presidents actually leave them unaccountable in the
long-term.
Therefore, our focus should shift to short-term accountability with more
immediate consequences. This Section demonstrates how incorporating an
agency in the emergency determination could impact two areas: (1)
triggering the APA and its accompanying procedural requirements and
judicial review, which will then assist courts in reviewing (2) the
interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms. Each of these is discussed
below.
1. Administrative Procedure Act Requirements
The most important way that including an agency in the decisionmaking process enhances the short-term accountability is in triggering the
APA. As discussed above, presidents can avoid the APA, its rulemaking
requirements, and corresponding judicial review.320 As Justice Kagan has
noted, “Presidential action occurring under a direct regulation usually is
insulated from legal challenge, except when the challenge is constitutional
in nature.”321 Challenges to presidential uses of unilateral emergency
authority would prove much more difficult against a sitting president, not
only because of the traditionally strong deference given to presidents in
national security situations,322 but also because of the strength of executive
privilege323 and preclusion.324 Furthermore, as discussed above, courts are
often hesitant to review a president’s actions, particularly where national
security is concerned.325
Agencies, on the other hand, are generally bound by procedural rules
under the APA’s rulemaking and adjudication provisions, which provide
notice-and-comment opportunities to encourage public engagement in
agency decision-making, promote agency transparency, and ensure due

320

See supra Section II.B.
Kagan, supra note 33, at 2368.
322
Stein, supra note 3, at 1219.
323
See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392–93 (1974); see also
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“White House produced certain documents but
withheld others under deliberative process privilege and presidential communications privilege.”).
324
See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (“How the President chooses to exercise the
discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for our review.”).
325
See supra Part II; Stein, supra note 3, at 1185.
321
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process protections in the adjudicative context.326 Critics of unilateral
presidential delegations also argue that agency rulemaking procedures can
be more transparent than presidential directives, further enhancing
accountability.327 Acknowledging that there is less concern when Congress
delegates to an agency because judicial review is applicable, even Justice
Kagan admits that “given the difficulty of controlling the exercise of
discretion delegated to the President . . . rule of law values may counsel extra
hesitation in allowing the delegation in the first instance.”328 Her view of
“presidential administration” focuses more on direct delegations to an
agency and therefore only teeters on the edge of the focus of this Article—
direct delegations to a president.
The APA also empowers courts to review agency actions. Notably, it
directs reviewing courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed” and to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions” that violate the law or are otherwise “arbitrary
[and] capricious.”329 As a Congressional Research Service report explains:
Pursuant to this mandate, courts are authorized to review agency action in a
number of contexts. First, courts will examine the statutory authority for an
agency’s action and will invalidate agency choices that exceed these limits. In
addition, a court may examine an agency’s discretionary decisions, or discrete
actions with legal consequences for the public. Finally, courts may also review

326

5 U.S.C. § 553 (rulemaking); id. § 554 (adjudication). But see sources cited supra note 68.
Mashaw & Berke, supra note 319, at 611 (“[T]o the degree that administration action is motivated
by political considerations emanating from the White House, there is a necessary loss of transparency
compared with agency action carried out through normal administrative procedures.”); id. at 612
(“Presidential administration tends by its very nature to limit the actors who are engaged in policy
discussions and conceal the real motivations and considerations behind the administrative policies.”); id.
(“Agency rulemaking processes are arguably the most open and deliberative of any processes in American
federal governance. And to that degree, presidential administration is antithetical to . . . democratic
accountability . . . .”); Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 896 (2017) (“A
problem inside the executive, however, is that legal understandings can change in secret—through
unpublished, sometimes close-hold decisions that prevent public notice or democratic feedback as to
those altered understandings.”); Watts, supra note 41, at 686 (“Yet other tools [of presidential control],
including more veiled OMB review and behind-closed-door communications, may undermine
transparency and the rule of law, taint agency science, and cast doubt on the legitimacy of agencies’
decisions.”).
328
Kagan, supra note 33, at 2369 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1976)).
329
5 U.S.C. § 706; see JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y74H-KQQX].
327
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an agency’s compliance with statutory procedural requirements, such as the
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures imposed by the APA. 330

Opponents seeking to challenge agency actions face potential
roadblocks related to preclusion, jurisdiction, standing, exhaustion, and
ripeness, which slow the decision-making process for apt judicial
deliberation.331 But at least they have a valid basis for judicial review.
When the DOE issues emergency orders under FPA § 202(c), for
instance, it provides a basis for judicial review of the DOE’s “justifications
for intervention.”332 FPA § 313(b) provides for judicial review333 and
opponents would likely be able to seek relief under traditional rules.334 As
just one example, the parties to the FPA § 202(c) emergency mandated
electricity sales were denied a FERC refund due to the compulsory nature of
the sales.335 These parties challenged the methods and information FERC
used to determine what satisfies a § 202(c) exemption.336 Despite the
difficulties in suing agencies, they pale in comparison to the challenges
associated with challenging presidential emergency energy findings.337 As
such, application of the APA therefore has the potential to enhance both
procedural rigor and strengthen judicial review of emergency
determinations.

330

COLE, supra note 329, at Summary.
Richard L. Hughes, Roadblocks to Judicial Review of Department of Energy and Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Administrative Actions, 22 TULSA L. REV. 601, 601 (1986).
332
JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 11.
333
16 U.S.C. § 825l(b); Hughes, supra note 331, at 603 (“The legislative history of the DOE
Organization Act provides expressly for judicial review through ‘Title V—Administrative Procedures
and Judicial Review.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-164, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 854, 897–900)); 16 U.S.C. § 823a(d)(B).
334
See, e.g., Hunter v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 527 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The four
factors which courts in this Circuit consider when determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to injunctive
relief are whether: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of its
claims; (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the defendants are not enjoined; (3) an injunction
would not substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) the public interest favors issuing an
injunction.”).
335
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of the State of Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 462 F.3d 1027, 1065
(9th Cir. 2006).
336
See id. at 1064–65 (granting motion to strike with respect to § 202(c) transactions); see also PPL
Wallingford Energy LLC v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 419 F.3d 1194, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating
and remanding orders made by FERC that rejected power companies’ agreement to provide electric power
with ISO New England on a cost-of-service basis).
337
Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–18.
331
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2. Ambiguous Statutory Terms
As discussed in my prior work, this short-term accountability is even
more necessary when statutory terms are not well defined. This can lead to a
troublesome ripple effect, where a president can take liberties to interpret
undefined terms in a way that is favorable to her purpose and not easily
subject to dispute, which can lead to a court reviewing a president’s statutory
interpretation with uncertain deference.338 As such, one ambiguous term can
destabilize an entire statutory purpose. Many of the statutes, including the
NGA, the DPA, and the Atomic Energy Act, fail to include any definition of
what constitutes an energy emergency to unlock a president’s powers. Even
where Congress does include a relevant definition, many of the embedded
emergency terms are often left undefined. Even though the FPA defines a
“grid security emergency,”339 for instance, there is still much ambiguity
within the definition. What does it mean to be “imminent”? What are
“significant adverse effects on reliability”?340 This suggests that accidental
grid emergencies would not trigger this authority. What about a
cybersecurity attack? That does not appear to satisfy the “direct physical
attack,” but could it be regarded as a “malicious act using electronic
communication”?341 Or does it fall through the cracks of the FPA?
Similarly, the EPCA provides a definition of a “severe energy supply
interruption” and conditions many emergency powers on the President
determining that the definition is satisfied.342 But at what threshold can a
president determine that there is a “national energy supply shortage,” what
is a “significant” scope and duration, and what are “adverse impacts”?343 We
are no strangers to undefined terms in statutes, but the stakes are quite high
where the meaning of the term is not about the scope of regulation, but about
the power to shut down an entire industry or facility.
The definitional ambiguity might be justified by the benefits of
flexibility; however, these potential benefits also come with attendant costs,
including uncertain deference provided to a statutory president.344 As just one
example, the Trump Administration has also attempted to stretch the concept

338

Id.
See supra notes 201–202.
340
Federal Power Act § 215A (as amended), 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7)(B).
341
16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7).
342
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8511 (conservation targets); id. § 8374(a) (coal allocation); id. § 8374(b)
(natural gas or petroleum prohibitions).
343
Id. § 6202(8).
344
See Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 267, 299–300.
339
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of an energy emergency to bail out a failing coal industry.345 What is to stop
presidents from continuing to expand the definition of an energy emergency
to unlock statutory powers for nonemergency purposes? Could climate
change qualify as an energy emergency?346
As such, even those who argue for the benefits of broad and vague
powers in a time of crisis contemplate adding useful limiting criteria.347 The
problem of undefined statutory terms left to be interpreted by a president is
even more troublesome when one understands the dearth of clarity on
judicial review of such presidential statutory interpretations. As Professor
Stack and I separately address elsewhere, there is a lack of judicial consensus
on the standard of review to apply to such situations.348 In short, by providing
more clarity in the relevant terms, Congress would constrain the amount of
discretion that the President would have to interpret the term however they
see fit. Accordingly, more concrete definition and prescriptive preconditions
that must be satisfied prior to unlocking such powers could enhance shortterm accountability by bolstering the judiciary’s ability to review the
President’s actions.
C. Consistency: An Executive Divided
As a starting place, it is not clear how important policy consistency
actually is for emergencies. In fact, emergencies are often the place where
there is deviation from the norm—special circumstances justify special
accommodations. But perhaps even more important is the unappreciated
benefit that can come from inconsistency. In this sense, there are benefits of
345
Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Sept. 29, 2017) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
346
Dan Farber, Using Emergency Powers to Fight Climate Change, LEGAL PLANET (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://legal-planet.org/2019/01/14/using-emergency-powers-to-fight-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/PEW4-ZYDS]; Ball, supra note 66, at 923 (concluding that “our constitutional
structure, especially with a view toward legal and structural stability, necessitates that this [climatechange emergency] power belongs to the President or Congress, and not the executive agencies”). But
see John Schwartz & Tik Root, Could a Future President Declare a Climate Emergency?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/climate/climate-national-emergency-hotwater.html [https://perma.cc/Y7C5-ADHS] (noting that most emergency powers “cut the other way” and
would be unsuitable for climate change because they “allow the president to temporarily suspend
environmental protections . . . [as] in the case of a national emergency that requires a quick surge in
energy production”).
347
PAUL N. STOCKTON, RESILIENCE FOR GRID SECURITY EMERGENCIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INDUSTRY–GOVERNMENT
COLLABORATION
20
(2018),
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1059491.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XAV-TH9P] (arguing that both
the imminence of an attack and the potential consequences of the attack should be two criteria the
President considers before declaring a “grid security emergency”).
348
See Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–04; Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 299–300.
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disagreement between the President and an agency, as the resulting friction
can sometimes result in an agency changing a president’s mind. Even though
many of the disagreements between a president and her agencies often
remain internal and confidential to the administration, there are a number of
instances where agencies have publicly disagreed with a president. In 2005,
Assistant Federal Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner Susan F.
Wood resigned in protest of the FDA’s decision to delay final ruling on overthe-counter accessibility of the morning-after pill.349 In another instance,
former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that he had to disagree with
President Trump repeatedly and tell him that his actions violated the law.350
Additionally, former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen
disagreed with President Trump when he asked her to close the southern
border.351 Most recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump’s
scientific advisors have diplomatically, yet repeatedly, contradicted the
President during publicly televised official White House briefings.352
In some of these examples, the agencies caved to presidential
pressure.353 In others, the agency actors appear to have convinced the

349
Marc Kaufman, FDA Official Quits over Delay on Plan B, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/31/AR2005083101271.html
[https://perma.cc/N78S-XY5C].
350
Caitlin Oprysko, ‘It Violates the Law’: Tillerson Vents About Having to Repeatedly Push Back
Against Trump, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/07/tillersonspills-on-trump-1048884 [https://perma.cc/PTZ3-N69C].
351
Stephen Collinson, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen’s Ouster Exposes Trump’s Immigration
Crisis, CNN (Apr. 8, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/politics/donald-trump-kirstjennielsen-immigration/index.html [https://perma.cc/J3NE-NUBW]. Additional cases of disagreement with
President Trump include White House counsel Don McGahn refusing to fire Robert Mueller in 2017,
Grace Segers, McGahn, Wary of “Saturday Night Massacre,” Refused Trump Order to Fire Mueller,
CBS NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mueller-report-white-housecounsel-don-mcgahn-refused-trump-order-to-fire-mueller-wary-of-saturday-night-massacre/
[https://perma.cc/VGC6-PB85], and disagreement by ICE on President Trump’s proposal to take
apprehended migrants crossing the border to sanctuary cities, Rachael Bade & Nick Miroff, White House
Proposed Releasing Immigrant Detainees in Sanctuary Cities, Targeting Political Foes, WASH. POST
(Apr. 11, 2019, 10:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/white-house-proposedreleasing-immigrant-detainees-in-sanctuary-cities-targeting-political-foes/2019/04/11/72839bc8-5c6811e9-9625-01d48d50ef75_story.html?utm_term=.37f53a02f44e [https://perma.cc/8CH4-4YPY].
352
See, e.g., Libby Cathey, Trump Versus the Doctors: When the President and His Experts
Contradict Each Other, ABC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020, 6:55 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumpversus-doctors-president-experts-contradict/story?id=70330642
[https://perma.cc/5RQ3-AFMV]
(detailing transcript contradictions between the President and his top infectious-disease experts on testing
capacity, virus resurgence, and treatments using hydroxychloroquine and household disinfectants).
353
Secretary of Defense Mattis signed an order to remove troops from Syria despite disagreeing. He
later resigned because of a difference in views. Nancy A. Youssef & Gordon Lubold, Mattis, Blindsided
by Trump’s Syria Decision, Resigned Days Later, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2018, 9:38 PM),
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President to abandon his initial push. For example, the EPA Deputy
Administrator during the Nixon Administration reported that he was called
to the White House in an effort to drop an enforcement action against a
company which had supported President Nixon in the election.354 The
incident was leaked, and after congressional hearings, the White House
backed off and the EPA Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, said he would
resign if EPA decisions were overruled due to political considerations.355
Similarly, during the George W. Bush Administration, large numbers of
legal officials in the CIA, FBI, and Justice Department threatened to resign,
forcing the Administration to make significant changes to its surveillance
program.356
Another recent example of agency resistance can be found in President
Trump’s efforts to bail out the failing coal industry. After pressure from coalindustry CEOs to invoke FPA § 202(c),357 President Trump directed his
Energy Secretary to use his authority to pressure FERC to bail out the failing
coal industry;358 the DOE complied with the President’s request by issuing a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for a market rule relying on FPA §§ 205 and
206 and submitting its request to FERC.359 However, FERC resisted,
providing an example of both an executive agency’s acquiescence (the DOE)
and an independent agency’s resistance to a president’s desires (FERC).360 In
response, coal CEOs again pushed the President and DOE to invoke § 202(c)
and the White House directed the DOE to explore this issue further,361
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mattis-blindsided-by-trumps-syria-decision-resigned-days-later11545446308 [https://perma.cc/QA3N-J43F].
354
Percival, supra note 39, at 2498.
355
Id.
356
Id. at 2524–28.
357
JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 21–22.
358
Id. at 1617.
359
Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,941 (proposed Sept. 29, 2017) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
360
Memorandum
from
FERC
(May
29,
2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html [https://perma.cc/R63D-ELLF].
361
Statement from the Press Secretary on Fuel-Secure Power Facilities, THE WHITE HOUSE (June
1, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-fuel-securepower-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/3KE5-S8NX]; see Letter from Rick C. Giannantonio, Gen. Couns.,
FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., to James Richard Perry, Sec’y of Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy 31 (Mar. 29,
2018),
https://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/fes-202c-application.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KC9W-X6M5] (requesting invocation of FPA § 202(c) and an emergency order
“directing (i) the subject baseload nuclear and coal-fired generators to enter into contracts . . . with
PJM . . . to generate, deliver, interchange, and transmit electric energy, capacity, and ancillary
services . . . and (ii) PJM to pay . . . reasonable cost-based rates that provide for full cost recovery
consistent with ratemaking standards and principles or as otherwise necessary to ensure continued
operations”).
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resulting in a leaked DOE proposal that would have relied on FPA § 202(c)
and the DPA.362 As a result of FERC’s strong opposition to the bailout plan
and the potential use of FPA § 202(c) and the DPA, neither were invoked.363
Had there been no independent agency involvement, President Trump could
have made the unilateral decision to implement this bailout.
Further, this was not the first time that FERC tempered an overzealous
request to invoke FPA § 202(c) authority. In 1973, Arab members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil
embargo against the United States in retaliation for the U.S. decision to
resupply the Israeli military.364 The oil embargo placed immense pressure on
oil supplies, and local utilities requested the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) (FERC’s predecessor) to issue an FPA § 202(c) order to facilitate
cooperation between domestic oil companies.365 The FPC rejected the
§ 202(c) request, finding the agency was already able to facilitate successful
cooperation without declaring an emergency.366 Although the agency was not
tempering a request from the President, it does show the power of the agency
to withstand pressure.
These examples of agencies flexing their muscles against a strong
president can be countered by the numerous times that agency officials have
been removed for failing to fall in line with a president’s preferences.
President Trump alone has removed numerous high-profile officials for
registering disagreement.367 Although theses removals have other deleterious
effects on the healthy functioning of an administration, they also have
important signaling effects to the public on the degree to which a president’s
actions may be out of line with other informed experts and demonstrate the
potential benefit of agency involvement in former unilateral presidential
decisions.368

362

See JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 23.
Jeff St. John, FERC Commissioners Agree: No Grid Emergency Exists to Justify Coal, Nuclear
Bailout, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 12, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferccommissioners-agree-no-grid-emergency-exists#gs.uAKGntk [https://perma.cc/9GCQ-25GD].
364
New Eng. Power Pool Participants, 54 F.P.C. 1375, 1375–76 (1975).
365
Id.
366
Id. at 1375. The D.C. Circuit later affirmed the Commission’s decision to decline to exercise its
emergency powers. Richmond Power & Light v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 574 F.2d 610, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
367
Jan Diehm, Sam Petulla & Zachary B. Wolf, Who Has Left Trump’s Administration and Orbit?,
CNN (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/08/politics/trump-admin-departures-trnd/
[https://perma.cc/R95J-SUNE].
368
See, e.g., Huq, supra note 313, at 4; Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal
Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1371 (2012).
363
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D. Expediency: Benefits of Bureaucracy
The last justification for unilateral delegation is expediency. The
bureaucracy generated by including an agency in the decision-making
process is often viewed as a negative.369 But delegating to an agency also
creates a buffer between a crisis and an overzealous president. For those who
believe agencies are merely pawns of the President, this additional layer of
authority should have minimal impact. But for those who believe that
agencies can resist the President, the impact would only make a difference
where perhaps it should. In most times of emergency, there should be no
disagreement between the energy agencies and the President. But where
agencies (especially those beholden to the President) and the President
disagree, this disagreement should raise red flags and perhaps the resulting
delay is necessary and beneficial.
This Section encourages a contrarian view of agency bureaucracy as a
positive internal check on a president. Other scholars have had a similar
response to the inclusion of agencies in statutory delegations. Professor
Stack has spent the last decade expertly exploring the nuances of the
“statutory President,” focusing on complicated and necessary questions of
deference, reviewability, and contingent delegations.370 As part of this work,
he argues that delegation to an agency, as opposed to the President, “creates
a check on the President’s claims of authority internal to the executive
branch.”371
Gillian Metzger argued recently that the fundamental features of the
administrative state—“bureaucratic oversight, expertise, professionalism,
structural insulation, procedural requirements, and the like . . . hold[] the key to
securing accountable, constrained, and effective exercises of executive
power.” In particular, the structure of the federal bureaucracy helps to “forestall
presidential aggrandizement.”372

These arguments suggest that the bureaucratic burdens of agency
involvement are worth the cost, but they acknowledge that payment will still
be due. Involving agencies in these emergency decisions will necessarily
369

Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 846–47 (2014).
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1013–14
(2007); Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 304–10; Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the
President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172–73 (2009); Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory
President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 553 (2005) (“The only potential constitutional source of procedural
constraint on presidential orders is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).
371
Stack, supra note 112, at 10.
372
Kovacs, supra note 55, at 559 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 78 (2017)).
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increase the transaction costs by including more people in the decisionmaking process, triggering procedural requirements with which the agency
must comply, and increasing the amount of time that may be required to
reach a consensus.
To mitigate these bureaucratic costs, Congress could structure the
relationship between the President and the agency more thoughtfully. For
instance, as I have argued elsewhere, Congress could subject the agency to
differing degrees of scrutiny, depending on the type of emergency being
faced.373 I proposed a sliding scale for different types of emergencies, from
acute (discrete, specific incidents capable of identification) to chronic
(generalized threats with indistinct beginnings and ends or those recognized
as perpetual) emergencies, with corresponding procedural requirements.374
This idea is not entirely new. Section 3 of the Energy Emergency
Preparedness Act of 1982 (EEPA) also adopted a sliding scale for triggering
presidential authority. It divides “the threshold standards for activation of the
President’s statutory authorities”375 into three categories: “(i) situations
involving limited or general war, international tensions that threaten national
security, and other Presidentially declared emergencies; (ii) events resulting
in activation of the international energy program; and (iii) events or
situations less severe than those described in clauses (i) and (ii).”376 Where
energy emergencies are not acute, Congress can require the President to
document the justifications for unlocking these powers.377 Professor Kathryn
Watts and I have both argued for application of administrative law doctrines
to help enhance accountability and control over unbridled executive
authority.378 While she focused on tools to enhance transparency and
373

Stein, supra note 3, at 125256.
Id. at 1253.
375
Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Counsel, to the
President on Legal Authorities Available to the President to Respond to a Severe Energy Supply
Interruption or Other Substantial Reduction in Available Petroleum Products 648 (Nov. 15, 1982),
https://www.justice.gov/file/23221/download [https://perma.cc/5T8W-TLSW].
376
Energy Emergency Preparedness Act of 1982 § 272(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6282, repealed by Act
of Nov. 9, 2000, Pub. L. 106-469, §104, 114 Stat. 2029, 2033.
377
See Stein, supra note 3, at 1252–56. For example, immigration has been a chronic problem and
yet President Trump was able to invoke emergency powers without complying with any procedural
prerequisites. See supra note 8. Under my proposed approach, during chronic emergencies like
immigration, Congress would require the President to document why immigration is an emergency and
why addressing it requires the use of emergency powers. See Stein, supra note 3, at 1253.
378
See id. at 1245–52; Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 299–300; Kovacs, supra note 55,
at 563 (agreeing with Peter Shane “that presidential administration ‘breeds an insularity, defensiveness,
and even arrogance within the executive branch that undermines sound decision making, discounts the
rule of law, and attenuates the role of authentic deliberation in shaping political outcomes’” (quoting
SHANE, supra note 319, at 25)).
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process,379 I focused on procedural constraints to augment the record for
judicial review.380
There are already a number of examples where Congress requires an
agency to make factual findings before unlocking environmental emergency
powers. For instance, in evaluating the Occupational Safety and Health
Agency (OSHA)’s use of emergency authority, Congress required that
OSHA must first make two explicit findings. OSHA must find not only a
danger of exposure or even some danger from exposure, but also a grave
danger from exposure necessitating emergency action.381 Similarly, to issue
an emergency regulation under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the EPA
must publish in the Federal Register “detailed reasons why such regulation
is necessary” and give actual notice to appropriate state agencies of the
regulation.382 To issue an emergency standard under The Mine and Safety
Act, the Secretary of Labor must determine “that miners are exposed to grave
danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or
physically harmful, or to other hazards, and . . . that such emergency
standard is necessary to protect miners from such danger.”383 And before the
EPA can unlock its SDWA emergency authority, it “must explain and
document, as necessary, why the ordered action is needed even if state or
local governments may have taken or are taking actions to protect public
health,” and the EPA region must consult with The Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance.384
Just as Congress often requires that agencies make specific findings that
must be satisfied prior to unlocking emergency powers, presidents too should
be required to make specific findings where time and circumstances allow it.
Courts have argued that even imminent hazards should be subject to judicial
review to ensure that “the emergency action was [not] taken without
adequate determining principle or was unreasoned.”385 However, imposing
factual finding requirements on a president during a crisis may not sit well
with many. And it may not always alter the substantive outcome.386 It is
379
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381
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Int’l Union v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
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385
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See High Country Conservation Advocs. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1181 (D.
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possible, for instance, that a president faced with documenting her reasons
for invoking emergency authority may merely check the boxes facially
without actually documenting her true reasoning. But in certain
circumstances, the findings may play an important role in subsequent judicial
review.387 By providing a written record with justifications for invoking the
emergency power, a president would not only enhance transparency with the
public, but may provide a court with a record for review.388 And it may be
these actions on the margins that are a step in the right direction to help guide
a president towards the proper outcome.
Furthermore, mere involvement of an agency does not necessarily mean
a slower response. In fact, in situations where Congress has provided both
the President and an agency head with emergency powers, the agency is
sometimes the more responsive and more expedient delegate. In both the
H1N1 and COVID-19 pandemics, for instance, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services declared a public-health emergency long before the
presidents declared a “national emergency.”389
Courts have also recognized the need for agencies to act swiftly in
response to an emergency, noting the need to “ensure that the [EPA’s] power
under the Act remains ‘relatively untrammeled’” so “that [the] EPA can act
promptly and effectively when a threat to public health is imminent.”390
NEPA is a procedural statute designed to ensure public participation and transparent decision-making by
federal agencies.”); Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 669 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“The requirements of NEPA are purely procedural and do not mandate any specific outcome;
agencies may make a decision that preferences other factors over environmental concerns as long as they
have first adequately identified and analyzed the environmental impacts.”).
387
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–24 (2018).
388
See supra note 88 for examples where Congress imposed such procedural requirements on a
president.
389
See Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69 (stating that the virus was
first discovered in China in December 2019, on January 31 the Secretary declared a public-health
emergency, and on March 13 the President declared a national emergency). The delay between the first
COVID-19 case reported in the United States and the President’s response was about six weeks. For
H1N1, the delay was almost six months. Angelo Fichera, Flawed Comparison on Coronavirus, H1N1
Emergency Timelines, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.factcheck.org/2020/03/flawedcomparison-on-coronavirus-h1n1-emergency-timelines/ [https://perma.cc/9VM6-F8K6]; see also Eric
Lipton, David E. Sanger, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear, Mark Mazzetti & Julian E. Barnes, He
Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html
[https://perma.cc/8NBC-3V4D].
390
Trinity Am. Corp. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 150 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing a 1974
House report describing Congress’s intention that the EPA Administrator retain broad
emergency powers); see Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority
Under the SDWA and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10786, 10787–
88 (2017) (citing Trinity, 150 F.3d 389); W.R. Grace & Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 261 F.3d 330, 339 (3d Cir.
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Congress has done the same, often waiving rulemaking procedures for
agencies when delegating emergency powers to mimic the expedited process
that exists for the President. A number of these examples are below:
 The Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides that if there exists
an “emergency posing a significant risk to the well-being of any
species of fish or wildlife or plants,” the Secretary is given the
authority under the ESA to bypass ESA and APA rulemaking
procedures and issue immediate regulations.391
 The Mine Act allows the Secretary of Labor to issue emergency
health and safety standards “without regard to the Administrative
Procedure Act.”392
 The EPCA waives the thirty-day comment period for any
proposed rule or regulation where the President finds that such
waiver is necessary to act expeditiously during an emergency
affecting the national security of the United States.393
 The Disaster Relief Act waives the requirements of the APA
where the President commands the Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish a
threshold for eligibility for disaster relief,394 and the FEMA
Administrator may waive notice-and-comment rulemaking for
establishing criteria for the approval of applications for hazardmitigation assistance.395
In a similar way, by using acute and chronic distinctions, Congress
would be able to maintain the same level of responsiveness when the
emergency is deserving of the expedience of unilateral presidential action,
but would be able to demand more of a president where the emergency is
chronic and loosely defined. In summary, this last Part demonstrates how the
theorized justifications for unilateral presidential control actually support the
involvement of expert energy agencies in emergency energy determinations.
2001) (“Thus, it is well established from the legislative history and case law that SDWA confers on the
EPA broad authority to address present and future harm that may substantially threaten the health of
persons who use public water systems.”).
391
Environmental Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7). In such a case, the listing only lasts
240 days and expires if the agency does not adopt a final rule using standard rulemaking procedures. Id.
392
Int’l Union v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing 30 U.S.C.
§ 811(b)).
393
42 U.S.C. § 6393(a)(2)(A).
394
Id. § 5189(b)(2) (“[T]he President shall direct the Administrator to . . . immediately establish a
threshold for eligibility [for disaster relief] under this section in an appropriate amount, without regard to
chapter 5 of title 5.”).
395
Id. § 5170c.
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CONCLUSION
This Article embarked on a journey to explore the President’s authority
to act in times of an energy emergency. In evaluating a number of statutory
provisions regarding energy security, a disturbing pattern emerges. These
provisions paint a picture of the President empowered to operate without
meaningful oversight, guidance, judicial review, or counsel by her agency
experts. The amorphous nature of emergencies, the lack of energy expertise
unique to the President, and the potential for abuse of these powers suggest
that Congress should more sparingly delegate emergency energy powers
directly to the President.
Using statutory energy emergencies, this Article demonstrates that the
nation would be better served by including expert energy agencies in these
decisions, and that expertise, accountability, consistency, and expediency
can be achieved without fostering unilateral presidential power. Despite
unitary-theory contentions that delegations to executive agencies are
irrelevant to the President’s exercise of power, this Article demonstrates how
a shared delegation to the President and an expert agency can result in better
decision-making, particularly in an area such as energy with both executive
(the Department of Energy) and independent (the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission) agencies at the President’s disposal. A technical and
complicated sector such as energy deserves to have expert agencies involved
in critical emergency decisions, which can be done without unduly hindering
the President’s ability to act swiftly in times of emergency.
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